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Do people have a right to life simply by reason of their humanity
or citizenship? ... [S]hall we permit people to freeze to death in
the winter, to starve, to die from the effects of preventable disease,
merely because they are poor, insane, or addicted to drugs? In the
long run, the ways in which our society responds to that funda-
mental question will determine far more than the plight of the
homeless. It will define our civilization.'
I. INTRODUCTION
December 30, 1987, was an unusually cold night in Miami; tem-
peratures hovered around forty degrees Fahrenheit. The following
evening was the annual King Orange Bowl Parade, a nationally tele-
vised New Year's Eve extravaganza through the streets of downtown
Miami. Seventy-five persons slept in the streets around Camillus
House, one of downtown Miami's privately funded homeless shelters.2
1. Note, Hunger and Homelessness in America: A Survey of State Legislation, 66 DEN.
U.L. REV. 277, 287 (1989) (footnote omitted) (citing Blasi, Litigation on Behalf of the
Homeless: Systematic Approaches, 31 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 137 (1957)).
2. Camillus House is a privately funded shelter for homeless men. It offers a wide variety
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The individuals lay huddled in blankets supplied by the shelter.
Camillus House had closed it doors early that evening, as it often
must, because it was filled to capacity.' At 2:30 A.M., several City of
Miami police officers swept into the area and arrested forty-one home-
less persons4 for violating a City ordinance that prohibited sleeping in
the streets. 5 The director of Camillus House decried the City's
attempt to "clean up the streets" by eliminating the unsightly pres-
ence of homeless individuals prior to the parade.6
Similar atrocities have been perpetrated with increasing fre-
quency in cities across the country as police enforce legislation
prohibiting people from sleeping in the streets or on sidewalks," or
of services to Miami's homeless population, including meals, showers, mail service, clothing,
and health care. MIAMI COALITION FOR CARE TO THE HOMELESS, TOWARDS AN END TO
HOMELESSNESS AND HUNGER IN SOUTH FLORIDA: A PLAN FOR DADE AND MONROE
COUNTIES, 1989-1994, at 27 (1989); see also Greer, Medical Problems of the Homeless:
Consequences of a Lack of Social Policy-A Local Approach, 45 U. MIAMI L. REv. 407 (1990-
1991) (discussing Camillus Health Concern).
3. Camillus House has available space for 70 men. MIAMI COALITION FOR CARE TO
THE HOMELESS, supra note 2, at 27.
4. Ryan, Police Arrest Homeless Outside Camillus House, Miami News, Dec. 30, 1987, at
A4, col. 5.
5. MIAMI, FLA., CODE § 37-63 (1990) ("It shall be unlawful for any person to sleep on
any of the streets, sidewalks, public places or upon the private property of another without the
consent of the owner thereof.").
6. Ryan, supra note 4, at A4, cols. 5-6. The following night, the Miami police arrested
another 30 to 35 people in the downtown area. Prichard & Quadayol, Police Harass Homeless,
Camillus House Chief Says, Miami News, Dec. 31, 1987 at A5, col. 2, A5, col. 3. Police arrest
an estimated 3,000 to 4,000 people annually for sleeping in public in Miami. Police Arrest 40
Homeless People Sleeping Outside Crowded Shelter, Miami Herald, Dec. 31, 1987, at B2, col. 5.
As a result of the December 30, 1987, arrest, homeless advocates filed a class action lawsuit on
behalf of homeless people living in Miami. See Pottinger v. City of Miami, No. 88-2406 (S.D.
Fla. filed Dec. 30, 1988).
7. As homeless advocates recently argued in a case involving homeless persons in San
Diego, California:
Before the City of San Diego began its current -activities, the phrase the "crime of
homelessness" referred to the way our society treats the homeless, rather than
the culpability of the homeless themselves. The City of San Diego, however, is
disturbed by homelessness. It is unsightly, and therefore it is bad for business,
tourism, and public image. Thus, instead of social services, the City has sought a
more immediate solution by discovering the archaic remnant of a vagrancy
statute drafted in the 19th century and, based on that statute, declaring that the
homeless of San Diego are committing a crime by sleeping outside.
Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants' Demurrer at
1, Manicom v. Burgreen, No. 613914 (Cal. Sup. Ct., San Diego Cty. filed Aug. 2, 1989); see
also CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(i) (West 1988) (prohibiting "lodg[ing] in any building, struc-
ture, vehicle or place, whether public or private, without the permission of the owner or person
entitled to [its] possession or control); PHOENIX, ARIZ., CITY CODE § 23-48.01 (1981) (provid-
ing that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to use a public street .... sidewalk [or] other
right-of-way, for lying, sleeping, or otherwise remaining in a sitting position thereon, except in
the case of a physical emergency or the administration of medical assistance), cited in Seeley v.
State, 134 Ariz. 263, 655 P.2d 803 (Ct. App. 1982); L.A. Times, Sept. 21, 1988, at Pt. 2, col. I
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remaining in parks after closing hours.8  These arrests are sympto-
matic of a clash of competing interests between homeless persons' exi-
gency to perform fundamental life activities9 in public, " and non-
homeless citizens' desire to be able to utilize freely public facilities
without encountering "unsightly" homeless people. Government, the
entity entrusted with regulating and maintaining public health, safety,
and welfare, is largely responsible for balancing these competing
interests. To put the tension in perspective, one must first try to
(discussing the issuance of citations in San Diego for violating statute); L.A. Times, Mar. 31,
1988, at Pt. 2' col. 5 (describing the enforcement of an ordinance prohibiting sleeping on the
beach in Los Angeles). Other ordinances utilized against homeless persons prohibit loitering,
engaging in disorderly conduct, and displaying public intoxication. For an account of a home-
less person sweep in Santa Ana, California, see Santa Ana Police Chief Vows to Continue with
Sweeps; Civil Rights: Despite Questions of Legality, He Defends the Roundup of 64 Homeless
Men at the Civic Center on Wednesday, L.A. Times, Aug. 18, 1990, at B5, col. 3 (Orange Cty.
ed.) (explaining that homeless people were held for six hours for one of four infractions: jay-
walking, urinating in public, public drunkenness, or littering); and 64 Homeless Men Seized in
Santa Ana Police Sweep; Crime: Officers Write Numbers on Arms of Those Arrested: A Civil
Rights Proponent Says the Action Smacks of Nazism, L.A. Times, Aug. 17, 1990, at B6, col. 1
(Orange Cty. ed.) (noting that police wrote large, red numbers on the forearms of the homeless
persons arrested).
8. See SANTA BARBARA, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 15.16.085 (1986), cited in People v.
Davenport, 176 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 10, 222 Cal. Rptr. 736 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1141-42 (1986); see also Rogers, Police 'Bum Busters' Oust the Homeless,
Miami Herald, Feb. 27, 1991, at Al, col. 2 (describing the arrest of 200 people for sleeping in
parks in downtown Miami); Molotsky, Upset by Beggars, Washington Is Arresting Them, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 7, 1990, at A20, col. 4, A20 col. 5 (describing Washington, D.C.'s use of a law
prohibiting "wandering abroad and begging"); Ifill, Sympathy Wanes for Homeless; Funding
Drop, Arrests Herald New Attitude, Wash. Post, May 21, 1990, at Al, col. 1 (describing
Atlanta's change of attitude, resulting in a campaign to arrest homeless men and women for
blocking traffic and being drunk in public); Kifner, Police Dismantle Tent City in Lower East
Side Park, N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1989, at A6, col. 1 (describing eviction of 90 homeless persons
from an encampment in a New York park); Dunlap, Stern Seeks Expanded Rules to Curb
House of Parks in New York, N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1989, at Bl, col. 2 (describing expanded
city park regulations that forbid overnight sleeping, begging, or loitering).
9. Fundamental life activities can be separated into two categories. The first category
includes those activities that are absolutely essential to the maintenance of life (e.g., sleeping,
eating, and tending to personal hygiene). The second category includes those activities that are
necessary for a balanced and normal lifestyle (e.g., socializing and moving around freely).
10. The vast majority of homeless persons lack a place in which to perform basic life
activities. Although some homeless persons live in shelters, many do not enjoy such "luxury."
Those that do are usually required to leave during the day. Finally, because many shelters are
unsafe, homeless persons often choose to remain on the streets rather than risk their personal
safety by sleeping in shelters. See Gibbs, Answers at Last: After a Decade of Despair,
Americans Are Finding Ways to Help the Homeless by Providing Treatment, Counseling and
Training-Along with Shelter, TIME, Dec. 17, 1990, at 44, 46 (describing how men in shelters
prevent theft by sleeping with their shoes wedged under the legs of their cots); Barron, In
Bitter Cold, Some of Homeless Resist Shelters They Often Fear, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1988, at
Al, col. 2; Thornton, Gangs, Drug Sales Found in the Shelters, Chicago Tribune, Mar. 24,
1988, at C2, col. 1.
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understand the magnitude of homelessness and its origins.1 1
Congress defines a homeless individual as:
(1) an individual who lacks a fixed, regular, and adequate night-
time residence; and
(2) an individual who has a primary nighttime residence that is-
(A) a supervised... shelter designed to provide temporary
living accommodations...;
(B) ... a temporary residence for individuals intended to be
institutionalized; or
(C) a public or private place not designed for, or ordinarily
used as, a regular sleeping accommodation for human beings. 2
This broad definition encompasses an extremely diverse group of per-
sons with disparate needs. 13 The homeless population includes fami-
11. For a discussion of the causes of homelessness and attempts by local governments to
remove homeless individuals from public areas, see Comment, The Unconstitutionality of
'Antihomeless' Laws: Ordinances Prohibiting Sleeping in Outdoor Public Areas as a Violation of
the Right to Travel, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 595 (1989). See also R. ROPERS, THE INVISIBLE
HOMELESS: A NEW URBAN ECOLOGY (1988) (providing insights into the origins and nature
of homelessness in America).
12. Steward B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11302(a) (1988). Some
commentators have broadened this definition to include persons living in unsafe or unsanitary
housing. See Chackes, Sheltering the Homeless: Judicial Enforcement of Governmental Duties
to the Poor, 31 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 155 (1987).
13. Although most homeless individuals require assistance in obtaining health care, food,
and other basic subsistence items, certain sub-groups of the homeless population require
additional services. For example, homeless substance abusers need assistance in overcoming
the cycle of their addictions. The homeless mentally ill require community outreach
programs, psychological counseling, and, possibly, drug therapy. The unemployed homeless
need employment assistance, job training, and counseling. Homeless families need child-care
assistance. A city official in Kansas City described some of the consequences of homelessness:
Adults exhibit a state of hopelessness, sometimes so severe that it limits their
ability to focus beyond meeting immediate demanding needs. Low self-esteem
also characterizes many, perhaps, most of the women. The longer individuals
remain in a shelter, the greater the negative impact of their situation on their
behavior.
The impact of homelessness on children is varied and extreme, and it is
probably much more severe than we can currently determine. We do know that
younger children suffer developmental delays and often persist in infantile
behavior into and beyond the pre-school years. We have observed that older
children often assume parental roles toward younger siblings and their parents.
Such inappropriate role assumption typifies the development problem even at
these older ages. Low self-esteem emerges as a factor in disruptive and self-
destructive behavior of teens. Sadly, these and other undesirable effects of
homelessness on children are often beyond the parents' ability to cope, given the
magnitude of their personal problems.
U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, A STATUS REPORT ON HUNGER AND HOMELESSNESS IN
AMERICA'S CITIES: 1989, at 31 (1989) (hereinafter U.S. MAYORS); see also Herr, Children
Without Homes: Rights to Education and to Family Stability, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 337 (1990-
1991) (discussing basic issues in mapping legal strategies for homeless children); Comment,
The Homeless School-Age Child: Can Educational Rights Meet Educational Needs?, 45 U.
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lies,' 4 mentally ill persons,"5 drug and alcohol abusers, I6 recently and
chronically unemployed persons,' 7 veterans,'" the working poor,' 9
and individuals suffering from AIDS.2°
Homelessness emerged in the early 1980's as one of this country's
largest and most visible social problems. 2' An alarming number of
MIAMI L. REV. 537 (1990-1991) (discussing statutory and litigative avenues for meeting the
education needs of homeless persons).
14. Families with children comprise, on average, 36% of the homeless population. U.S.
MAYORS, supra note 13, at 2 (1989). In New York, 60% of the homeless population are
families. Id. at 68.
15. Approximately 25% of homeless individuals are severely mentally ill. Id. at 2. Many
of the mentally ill homeless are "benefitting" from the deinstitutionalization policies of the
1960's. See E. TORREY, NOWHERE TO Go: THE TRAGIC ODYSSEY OF THE HOMELESS
MENTALLY ILL (1988); Belcher, Are Jails Replacing the Mental Health System for the
Homeless Mentally Ill?, 24 COMMUNITY HEALTH J. 185 (1988) (concluding that changes in
the mental health care system would prevent criminalization of homeless mentally ill persons);
McCoy, Enforcement Workshop: Policing the Homeless, 22 CRIM. L. BULL. 263 (1986)
(describing the failure of deinstitutionalization because of a lack of adequate community
facilities for the mentally ill).
16. An average of 44% of the homeless population in surveyed cities are substance
abusers. U.S. MAYORS, supra note 13, at 2.
17. An estimated 76% of homeless persons are unemployed. Id. at 2. It is extremely
difficult for homeless persons to break their unemployment cycle. They do not have access to
personal hygiene facilities to be presentable for job interviews and no permanent address or
telephone number to receive messages or to contact potential employers. See Rule,
Resentment of New Thatcher Tax Feeds the Bonfire of Britain's Anarchists, N.Y. Times, Apr.
29, 1990, at L3, col. 1 (quoting a homeless man encountering such difficulties).
18. Twenty-six percent of the homeless population are veterans. U.S. MAYORS, supra note
13, at 2.
19. An average of 24% of homeless persons are employed in full-time or part-time jobs.
Id. Some psychologists argue that the lack of "social support," including financial assistance
for child care and transportation, and emotional assistance through family and community
networks, may contribute to the perpetuation of one's homeless status. See Solarz & Bogat,
When Social Support Fails: The Homeless, 18 J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOLOGY 79 (1990).
20. Boston, Los Angeles, New Orleans, and Trenton reported that over five percent of
their homeless population are HIV-positive. U.S. MAYORS, supra note 13, at 29. Many of the
27 cities surveyed lacked the necessary information to respond to this inquiry. Id.; see also
Comment, Adding Insult to Injury: The Lack of Medically-Appropriate Housing for the
Homeless HIV-Ill, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 567 (1990-1991).
21. Homelessness existed as a social problem before the 1980's. The demographics of
today's homeless, however, differ significantly from that of earlier periods in that today's
homeless are younger people, include women and families, and are "considerably more
deprived in their housing." Rossi, The Family, Welfare and Homelessness, 4 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 281, 282 (1989); see also Hopper, The Ordeal of Shelter.:
Continuities and Discontinuities in the Public Response to Homelessness, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 301 (1989) (providing a historical perspective and discussing a social
recognition of homelessness); Stem, The Emergence of the Homeless as a Public Problem, 58
Soc. SERV. REV. 291, 293 (1984) (discussing how the "homeless" have been conceptualized in
the public's mind). Reid, in Law, Politics and the Homeless, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 115, 116
(1986), asserts that had the homelessness social problem arisen in the 1960's, it would have
been managed by President Johnson's "War on Poverty," which was instituted to create a
"Great Society," by funding programs such as the Model Cities Program. Id. Reid argues
that today's homeless are "one of the most vulnerable and stigmatized populations of our
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Americans are homeless, with estimates ranging from 250,000 to
3,000,000 persons.22 Some studies have estimated that the homeless
population is increasing by twenty-five percent annually.23 Concur-
rently, the number of shelter beds and the amount of low-income
housing has not kept pace with the rapidly rising demand. 24 Accord-
ing to a 1989 survey of twenty-seven major American cities, an aver-
age of twenty-two percent of the demand for emergency shelter goes
unmet.25  In seventy-eight percent of the surveyed cities, homeless
families are turned away from shelters because of a lack of
resources.26 In all of the surveyed cities, a lack of affordable housing
current society," id., because as poverty, alcohol, and drug abuse sweep across America, these
social problems are being largely ignored. Id. The Court is leaving the most difficult socio-
economic questions to policymakers, and the legislature is powerless to initiate new programs
because it is facing mounting budget deficits and social problem cutbacks. Id.
The factors that contributed to homelessness gathered momentum in the 1970's. Hopper
& Hamberg, The Making of America's Homeless: From Skid Row to New Poor, 1945-1984, in
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON HOUSING (R. Bratt, C. Hartman, & A. Meyerson eds. 1986)
(noting that during the 1945-1970 skid-row era America did not have a significant street-
dwelling population because of the availability of low-cost or free housing, even though it was
often of "wretched" quality).
22. Comment, Homeless Families: Do They Have a Right to Integrity?, 35 UCLA L. REV.
159, 162 (1987) (citing DEPARTMENT OF Hous. & URB. DEV., A REPORT TO THE
SECRETARY ON THE HOMELESS AND EMERGENCY SHELTERS, cited in Community for
Creative Non-Violence v. Pierce, 814 F.2d 663, 664-65 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (other citations
omitted)). Estimates of the number of homeless persons vary significantly depending on one's
definition of homelessness. See White, Representing "The Real Deal," 45 U. MIAMI L. REV.
271, 275 (1990-1991). For a report of the difficulties in counting the homeless population, see
Wessel, Street Sweep: Counting the Homeless Will Tax the Ingenuity of 1990 Census Takers,
Wall St. J., Nov. 14, 1989, at 1, col. 1.
23. In 1989, 27 major American cities reported that the demand for emergency shelter
increased by an average of 25%. U.S. MAYORS, supra note 13, at 2.
24. In 59% of the cities surveyed, emergency shelters must reject some homeless people
because of a lack of resources. Id.
25. Id. In many cities, the "homeless problem" is becoming markedly (and
embarrassingly) more noticeable as well.
There have always been beggars and vagrants in New York. But the surge in the
number of street people over the last few years has made many New Yorkers
uneasy and has shocked visitors to the city. Their presence has defined, for
many, an erosion in the quality of life and in concern for others.
Homeless advocates say many other cities are as burdened by the homeless
as New York. . . . [They say that] Los Angeles and Chicago may have
proportionately as many homeless as New York, and that complaints about
safety in huge government run shelters can be heard elsewhere in the country as
well.
But the problem is particularly visible in New York, where the homeless
have settled in the midst of a dense downtown area and have become part of the
daily routine. In other, more sprawling cities, the homeless are less visible, seen
more often on television news programs than in the streets.
Barbanel, Homeless: What New York Can't Do, N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1988, at Al, col. 4.
26. U.S. MAYORS, supra note 13, at 27.
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was identified as the principal cause of homelessness.27 Other causes
of homelessness include mental illness (and a lack of support services
for mentally ill people), 2 unemployment, 29 economic factors (such as
the erosion of real incomes among poor people),30 inadequate income
assistance programs,3' substance abuse (and a lack of needed support
services for substance abusers), 32 family crises and domestic vio-
lence,33 and criminal victimization.34
Poverty in the United States increased drastically during the
1980's. A 1990 Congressional Budget Office study determined that
the poorest twenty percent of Americans have an average pretax
income of only $7,725. 35 During the 1980's, this group's real income
shrunk by three percent, while their net federal tax rate increased by
sixteen percent.36 Concurrently, the wealthiest twenty percent of
Americans, who enjoy an average pretax income of $105,209, have
seen their real income grow by thirty-two percent, while their net fed-
eral tax rate dropped by five and one-half percent.37 President Rea-
gan, apparently believing that homeless persons choose to be
homeless, noted, "There are shelters in virtually every city and shel-
27. Id. at 2; see Heller, The Crisis in Low-Income Housing, 58 J. NEGRO EDUC. 281 (1989);
Wright & Lam, Homelessness and the Low-Income Housing Supply, 17 Soc. POL'Y 48 (1987).
28. U.S. MAYORS, supra note 13, at 42.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. For a report documenting the relationship between homeless families and
inadequate public assistance levels, see NATIONAL COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, OVER
THE EDGE: HOMELESS FAMILIES AND THE WELFARE SYSTEM (1988).
32. U.S. MAYORS, supra note 13, at 42; Kolata, Twins of the Streets: Homelessness and
Addiction, N.Y. Times, May 22, 1989, at Al, col. 2 (attributing drug and alcohol abuse as a
major reason for homelessness); see also Davidson, Cries for Help; Some Addicts Beg for Drug
Treatment, but Programs Are Full, Wall St. J., Sept. 4, 1990, at 1, col. 1 (describing the
shortage of drug treatment programs). But cf Letter to the Editor, N.Y. Times, June 12,
1989, at A18, col. 4 (arguing that such substance abuse is symptomatic, rather than a cause of
profound poverty and homelessness).
33. U.S. MAYORS, supra note 13, at 42.
34. Nearly 13% of the participants in a 1985 study of homeless persons (19.6% of women
and 8.9% of men) identified criminal victimization as the direct cause of their homelessness.
Of these crime victims, 68.8% were victims of family violence or assault. A. Solarz, Criminal
Victimization Among the Homeless 13-15, 19-20 (Oct. 29-Nov. 1, 1986) (paper presented at
the annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology).
35. Zaldivar, Tax Study Finds Rich Are Richer; Poor, Poorer, Miami Herald, Feb. 17,
1990, at Al, col. 1.
36. Id.
37. Id. A statistical analysis of American living standards published by the Economic
Policy Institute reported that in the 26 years from 1947 to 1973, average family incomes rose
by 111%. From 1973 to 1989, income increased only nine percent. Passell, Economic Scene,-
Harder Times, Softer Politics, N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1990, at D2, col. 1. In 1973, the poorest
40% of American families received 17% of the national income, while the richest 20% took
home 41%. Comparatively, by 1988, the poorest 40% of Americans pocketed only 15% of the
national income, while the richest 20% took home 44%. Id.
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ters here, and those people still prefer out there on the grates or the
lawn to going into one of those shelters.
'38
Local and state governmental responses to the problems of
homeless persons vary. Most of these governments are facing severe
budget shortfalls and have tremendously reduced social program
funding accordingly.39 Many cities have responded aggressively to
homeless individuals living in their streets and parks by arresting
them or by trying to relocate them to other locales.4' Other cities
have adopted a policy of benign neglect, tolerating homeless persons
on their streets as an unfortunate fact of urban life and permitting
them to sleep in parks, subways, and public buildings.4' Some cities,
which at first had been restrained in their response, have become less
tolerant as they find themselves "overrun" with homeless persons.42
Citizens grumble about an inability to walk down the street or use
public transportation without encountering homeless individuals beg-
38. Cannon, Reagan Cites 'Choice' by Homeless; Shelters Available President Says, Wash.
Post, Dec. 23, 1988, at A8, col 3. President Reagan also stated that a large percentage of
homeless citizens were "retarded" and blamed the ACLU for successfully promoting legal
changes that deinstitutionalized the mentally ill. Id. The President proclaimed, "They
wanted freedom, but they walked out to where there was nothing for them." Id.
39. See Verhovek, Cuomo Seeks Big Cuts; 10,000 May Be Laid Off, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18,
1990, at Al, col. I (discussing huge reductions in New York state's government workforce,
Medicaid, and social spending amounting to $200 million); Uchitelle, Data Verify Economic
Malaise: 16 States in or Near a Recession, N.Y. Times, July 16, 1990, at A1, col. 1 (noting that
16 states, with more than a third of the nation's population, are in a recession or close to one).
40. See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text. Often, arresting homeless men and
women has the effect of encouraging them to relocate. Other cities have actively enhanced the
relocation process by offering homeless persons free, one-way airplane and bus tickets. See
Plan to Bus Homeless Out of Town Questioned, UPI, Dec. 5, 1989 (LEXIS, Nexis library,
Omni file) (citing an Atlantic City, New Jersey councilwoman's plan to give one-way bus
tickets to homeless persons); Newspaper: Suburbs Shipping Their Homeless to Philadelphia,
UPI, Feb. 12, 1989 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file) (asserting that various suburban
organizations send homeless individuals to Philadelphia against their will); Johnson, Homeless
Get Ticket to Leave, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1988, at 52, col. 1 (describing a Burlington,
Vermont restaurant owner's offer to give homeless individuals a free one-way ticket out of
town).
41. In New York City, former Mayor Koch ruled out the use of criminal laws to deal with
homeless people explaining that "[tihere are other priorities to deal with in this town.... I
believe that New Yorkers, like all Americans, have compassion at heart and want a
compassionate response.... You cannot use police powers. They have nothing to do with the
shelter system." Barbanel, supra note 23, at B10, col. 1. The Koch administration used
coercion only to prevent people from freezing to death or to hospitalize severely mentally ill
people. However, these programs reached only a "tiny fraction of those on the streets." Id.
42. See Rimer, Public Areas Try to Repel Homeless, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1989, at Al, col.
I (describing the public's growing exasperation with the homeless population and explaining
municipalities' and public institutions' responses by using greater restrictions and access to city
parks, subways, and train stations); Freitag, For the Homeless, Public Spaces Are Growing
Smaller, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1989, at E5, col. 5 (describing the codes of conduct in public
spaces and the closing off of areas frequented by homeless).
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ging, sleeping, or simply existing.43 They protest that they cannot
enjoy the use of city parks that now house large camps of homeless
persons." Merchants in urban centers complain of difficulties in
attracting, or in simply retaining, customers.45
43. One New Yorker wrote of waiting for the Long Island Railroad on an evening when
service was extremely delayed:
Penn Station is a mecca of apparently homeless, drug-dealing, alcoholic,
pickpocketing, begging, stinking vagabonds. I spent much of the evening
negotiating my way through rivers of urine, broken glass and human feces. All
this in a place where commuters are not permitted to smoke cigarettes. Because
of the repulsive bathrooms and nauseating odors permeating the air, I was forced
to stand outdoors, unable to hear announcements.
It repels me to question how the [railroad], police department and the City
of New York can possibly let this continue. This situation is a clear infringement
on the rights of the general public. All the rules of public health and safety are
totally disregarded. These people must be encouraged to seek refuge in public
shelters.
Foggi, Clean Up Penn Station, Newsday, April 10, 1990, at 53, col. 1. The frequency of these
types of encounters depends on a number of factors, including whether one lives or works in an
urban area, and, if so, the method of commute. For example, most Miami residents never
come into contact with homeless individuals. Miami is a sprawling metropolis with several
urban centers. The homeless population is concentrated in only one such urban center, down-
town Miami. Few middle-class or more affluent individuals live downtown. Many Miami
residents who work downtown, drive to work, park in their buildings, and rarely come into
contact with homeless people. The only contact most Miami residents have with homeless
citizens is through television or newspaper accounts of their difficulties.
Miami residents cannot agree on where to locate a shelter for the homeless-"not in my
backyard." Camillus House, a privately funded shelter, was scheduled to move to another
area of Miami to permit the development of the neighborhood where it is currently located.
However, after a last minute bid by residents of the neighborhood that was scheduled to
receive the new shelter, the City of Miami Commission failed to permit the move. Goldfarb,
Miami Left Bruised by Camillus Vote, Miami Herald, Mar. 2, 1991, at BI, col. 4; Rogers, Stay
Put, City Tells Camillus; Commission Blocks Site Near Omni, Miami Herald, Mar. 1, 1991, at
BI, col. 5.
44. See Kifner, supra note 8, at A6, col. 1 (describing the clearing of an encampment of
homeless persons from New York's Tompkins Square Park). Parks Commissioner Henry
Stern said, "The Lower East Side is a very liberal community, but they found they had lost
their park and they weren't willing to live with that." Id. at A6, col. 4.
45. As one commentator noted,
The homeless are perceived at best as a constant irritant and at worst a
discouraging menace. This public perception translates into a major economic
drain on the downtown [Seattle] economy. Retailers, for example, lose potential
sales and have to pay increased security costs. Service providers ... are faced
with the prospect of reluctant or lost clients. Unnerved or fed-up employees seek
work elsewhere in the city. Commercial real estate managers lose revenue on
leases and suffer lower occupancy rates because of the street scene, and
convention promoters must steer visiting planners through a cordon sanitaire of
downtown streets to avoid exposing their clients to aggressive panhandlers or
drug dealers."
Roth, Perceptions of Menace: The Homeless and the Downtown Economy, 6 PAC. NORTHWEST
EXECUTIVE 2, 4 (1990); see also Buckley, D.C. Merchants Losing Patience with Panhandlers,
Wash. Post, Mar. 10, 1990, at BI, col. 2 (describing similar concerns in Washington, D.C.).
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The underlying question in this dilemma of competing interests is
whose interest should prevail. Homeless advocates maintain that
homeless persons have a right to shelter4 6 and that enforcement of
"anti-homeless" legislation, such as laws that prohibit sleeping on
sidewalks, violates both the right to unrestricted travel and to due
process.4 Conversely, local governments insist that their police
power gives them the right to enforce such laws to advance the public
health, safety, and welfare." The enforcement of anti-homeless legis-
lation against homeless citizens, however, only temporarily assuages
the problem because homeless citizens who are arrested and incarcer-
ated for minor offenses are generally released after several hours.49
Instead of maximizing the public welfare, enforcement of anti-home-
less ordinances avoids solving the homelessness problem and merely
encourages homeless persons to relocate from one city's streets to
become another city's burden.
This Comment argues that although local governments some-
times have significant, valid interests in utilizing anti-homeless legisla-
tion to maintain the public health, safety, and welfare, courts should
preclude enforcement of this legislation because it is either facially
unconstitutional, or unconstitutional as applied. More pointedly,
although the advancement of the public health, safety, and welfare is
reasonable and justifiable, arresting homeless citizens to remove them
from the streets and parks to encourage them to move elsewhere is
not. Section II analyzes "traditional" constitutional challenges to
anti-homeless ordinances on the basis of vagueness and overbreadth in
light of the current homelessness dilemma. Section III argues that
enforcement of anti-homeless ordinances is an unconstitutional pun-
ishment of homeless persons for involuntary manifestations of their
homeless status. Section IV examines enforcement of and defenses to
anti-homeless ordinances through the criminal law doctrines of justifi-
46. See Langdon & Kass, Homeless in America: Looking for the Right to Shelter, 19
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 305 (1985); Note, Establishing a Right to Shelterfor the Homeless,
50 BROOKLYN L. REV. 939 (1984); Comment, Finding a Right to Shelter for Homeless
Families, 22 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 719 (1988); Comment, supra note 22.
47. See Comment, supra note 11.
48. Cities contend that enforcing park closing hours allows them to conserve scarce
resources. See infra note 95. In addition, non-homeless citizens are often unable to use parks
because of fear of crime and apprehension in encountering homeless persons. See Seeley v.
State, 134 Ariz. 263, 267, 655 P.2d 803, 807 (Ct. App. 1982). Similarly, cities argue that they
should have the ability to keep city sidewalks clear for citizens to pass and that people should
have the right to walk down the street without fear and harassment from homeless persons.
Id. Finally, police argue that they are merely enforcing statutes against all violators and that
they cannot be expected to differentiate between homeless and non-homeless violators. See
infra note 165 and accompanying text.
49. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
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cation and excuse, and through the morality of the criminal law. Sec-
tion V then evaluates these constitutional challenges and defenses in
light of Pottinger v. City of Miami,5" a class action lawsuit against the
City of Miami, and suggests alternatives to arresting homeless indi-
viduals for violating anti-homeless ordinances. Section VI concludes
that because ordinances that prohibit sleeping in streets or in parks
after hours do nothing to alleviate homelessness, courts should pro-
hibit their enforcement and encourage cities to seek more humane,
long-term solutions. In other words, we must treat the causes and not
the effects of homelessness.
II. TRADITIONAL CHALLENGES TO VAGRANCY ORDINANCES:
VAGUENESS AND OVERBREADTH
Until the early 1970's, police often arrested persons who lived on
the streets for the crime of vagrancy.5 Vagrancy statutes evolved
from English common law,52 which punished such evils as "idleness,"
"loafing," and "wandering."'53 In the 1960's, a number of commenta-
50. No. 88-2406 (S.D. Fla. filed Dec. 30, 1988).
51. See infra notes 52-59.
52. English vagrancy law' found its roots in the decay of feudalism. Vagrancy laws were
first incorporated as a means of encouraging labor stability, i.e., to confine the laboring
population to certain places and require them to work for specified wages. Thereafter,
vagrancy laws were used to make criminal the status of poverty. The vagrant came to be
regarded not only as a runaway slave but also as a probable criminal. J. STEPHEN, 3 HISTORY
OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 266-75 (1883); see also Sherry, Vagrants, Rogues and
Vagabonds-Old Concepts in Need of Revision, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 557, 558-61 (1960)
(criticizing vagrancy statutes as antiquated); Note, The Vagrancy Concept Reconsidered:
Problems and Abuses of Status Criminality, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 102, 103-07 (1962) (arguing
that vagrancy statutes are an anachronism and reflect a disregard for basic criminal theory).
The justifications for punishing vagrancy included legislative imposition of the Protestant
work ethic and recognition of society's interest in preventing an individual from becoming a
"public charge," a manifestation of the right of the state to recognize social sensibilities and
protect "decent people" from contact with "undesirables," and protection of the public by
prevention of crime. Note, supra, at 102-03.
53. See infra note 55.
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tors decried their use,14 and in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,5"
the United States Supreme Court held vagrancy laws facially uncon-
stitutional. 6 Relying on the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause, which prohibits a state from "depriv[ing] any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law,"57 the Court held
that vagrancy laws were void for vagueness because they "fail[ed] to
give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated
conduct [was] forbidden by the statute,""8 and because they
"encourage[d] arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions.""
54. See Foote, Vagrancy- Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 603 (1956);
Lacey, Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Personal Condition, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1203 (1953);
Sherry, supra note 52; Note, supra note 52. Professor Caleb Foote warned of using vagrancy
statutes as a substitute for eliminating the root causes of particular social problems:
The common ground that brings such a motley assortment of human troubles
before the magistrates in vagrancy-type proceedings is the procedural laxity
which permits "conviction" for almost any kind of conduct and the existence of
the House of Corrections as an easy and convenient dumping-ground for
problems that appear to have no other immediate solution.
Foote, supra, at 631. Professor Foote also discussed the use of vagrancy ordinances to "dress
up the city center" by eliminating unattractive persons who were "loitering" and to "clean up
skid row" by arresting alcoholics who were sleeping on the streets. Id. at 631-33. He criti-
cized both uses of vagrancy ordinances, arguing that the former 'was unconstitutionally vague,
and that the latter was an entirely ineffective way of dealing with alcoholics' problems. Id.
55. 405 U.S. 156 (1972). Eight defendants were convicted for violating the Jacksonville,
Florida, vagrancy ordinance which provided as follows:
Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging, persons who
use juggling or unlawful games or plays, common drunkards, common night
walkers[,]... persons wandering or strolling around from place to place without
any lawful purpose or object, habitual loafers, disorderly persons[,] ... persons
able to work but habitually living upon the earnings of their wives and minor
children shall be deemed vagrants and, upon conviction in the Municipal Court
shall be punished as provided for Class D offenses."
Id. at 156 n.l. (citing JACKSONVILLE, FLA., CODE §§ 26-57 & 1-8 (1965)). Class D offenses at
the time of conviction were punishable by 90 days' imprisonment, $500 fine, or both. Id.
56. Id. at 171.
57. U.S. CONST. amend. 14, § 1.
58. Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 162 (citations omitted) (explaining that the constitutional
requirement of definiteness prohibits holding one responsible for conduct which he could not
reasonably understand to be proscribed); see United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954)
(describing the constitutional requirement of definiteness in a criminal statute); Lanzetta v.
New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939) (striking a criminal statute punishing membership in a gang
because it found that the law did not give fair notice of the offending conduct).
59. Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 162 (citations omitted). The Court also criticized the
ordinance because it was enforced to prevent future criminality:
A presumption that people who might walk or loaf or loiter or stroll ... are to
become future criminals is too precarious for a rule of law. The implicit
presumption in these generalized vagrancy standards-that crime is being nipped
in the bud-is too extravagant to deserve extended treatment. Of course,
vagrancy statutes are useful to the police. Of course, they are nets making easy
the round-up of so-called undesirables. But the rule of law implies equality and
justice in its application. Vagrancy laws.., teach that the scales of justice are so
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Many similar laws were invalidated under the fourteenth amend-
ment in later cases.6° In Kolender v. Lawson,61 for example, the Court
invalidated a California statute that "required persons who loiter or
wander on the streets to provide a 'credible and reliable' identification
and account for their presence when requested by a police officer. "62
The Court held the statute void for vagueness because it failed to give
actual notice to citizens of forbidden conduct and, more importantly,
because the legislature failed to "establish minimal guidelines to gov-
ern law enforcement. ' 63  The Court found that without "minimal
guidelines," the statute encouraged "arbitrary enforcement by failing
to describe with sufficient particularity what a suspect must do in
order to satisfy the statute. ' 64
Today, the legislation that local and state governments utilize to
police homeless persons (collectively referred to as anti-homeless leg-
islation) can be separated into two categories. One category includes
laws that utilize broad, inexplicit language, such as a ban on "lodg-
tipped that even-handed administration of the law is not possible. The rule of
law, evenly applied to minorities as well as majorities, to the poor as well as to
the rich, is the great mucilage that holds society together.
Id. at 171. The Court alludes to a possible racial motivation on the part of the police. Id. at
158-59.
The Papachristou opinion approaches vagrancy from a romanticized individual freedom
standpoint. The Court seems to be saying that laws should not be enacted or construed to
prohibit a person from choosing to walk the streets and live a life of leisure. Justice Douglas
writes of these activities as "historically part of the amenities of life as we have known them."
Id. at 164. He discusses the choice to walk the streets as being embodied by Walt Whitman's
"Song of the Open Road," by Lindsay's "I Want to Go Wandering," and by Thoreau's writ-
ings. Id. Today's homeless population no longer embodies endearing images of individual
freedom or of the "open road."
60. See, e.g., Squire v. Pace, 516 F.2d 240 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 840 (1975);
Waters v. McGuriman, 656 F. Supp. 923 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Farber v. Rochford, 407 F. Supp.
529 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
61. 461 U.S. 352 (1983).
62. Id. at 356.
63. Id. at 358.
64. Id. at 361.
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ing"65 or "public habitation. '66 Without legislative guidance, it is dif-
ficult for an individual to evaluate whether his actions constitute
illegal "lodging" or "habitat[ing]" in a public place.67 In addition,
without minimal definitional guidelines, the terms "lodging" or
"habitation" fail effectively to limit police conduct. Police, therefore,
retain complete discretion in determining whether someone is lodging
or habitating.68 Accordingly, under the Papachristou and Kolender
rationales, this broad, inexplicit form of anti-homeless legislation
should be facially invalidated under the fourteenth amendment due
process clause for vagueness because it fails to provide both the requi-
site public notice and police guidelines.69
The second category of anti-homeless legislation utilizes more
specific, narrow language, such as a prohibition against "sleeping on
public streets and sidewalks" and "remaining in parks after closing
65. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(i) (West 1988) (A person is guilty of disorderly conduct
when the person "lodges in any building, structure, vehicle or place, whether public or private,
without the permission of the owner or person entitled to the possession or in control
thereof.") Numerous homeless persons have been arrested in San Diego, California, for
violating this statute. The attorneys for the American Civil Liberties Union argue, in their
Demurrer to the State's complaint for an arrest of a homeless person, the difficulties with this
statute. A non-homeless person goes to a public park carrying a plastic bag with a change of
clothes and food for the afternoon. She spreads out an old sheet, drinks a beer, eats a bologna
sandwich she prepared earlier, and dozes off to sleep. Nearby, a person pushing a shopping
cart containing all of his worldly possessions, stops to rest, eats a bologna sandwich given to
her by a local shelter, and falls asleep. Which of these activities is lodging? Can police be
expected to draw a distinction between the two? Demurrer to Complaints; Memorandum of
Points and Authorities Supporting Demurrer at 6-8, State of California v. Griffan, Nos.
B973409 & B945720 (San Diego Mun. Ct. filed Aug. 18, 1988).
66. NEW ORLEANS, LA., MUNICIPAL CRIMINAL CODE § 42-80 (1987). This section
states:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person to commit the crime of unauthorized
public habitation [defined as]:
(1) The sleeping by any person on a street, sidewalk, neutral ground, alleyway,
park or other public property in this city; or
(2) The use of any motor vehicle.., for.., sleeping, cooking, washing, and/or
showering.
Id.
67. For example, to be "lodging" or "habitating" in a public place, must an individual
establish a temporary residence in public, or be sleeping in public, or be standing in public?
See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants'
Demurrer at 13, Manicom v. Burgreen, No. 613914 (Cal. Sup. Ct., San Diego Cty. filed Aug.
2, 1989).
68. Id. at 16; see also Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 168-69 (1971)
(noting that such ordinances place "almost unfettered discretion in the hands of police" and
replace the probable cause requirement for arrest of the fourth and fourteenth amendments
with a mere "suspicion" requirement).
69. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1982); Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 156. But cf
Statement of Decision on Demurrer at 2-3, People v. Robinson, No. B973545 (San Diego
Mun. Ct. filed Oct. 24, 1988) (finding the statute, CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(i) (West 1988),
prohibiting lodging not vague.)
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hours." 70 Courts have generally found this category of laws not
unconstitutionally vague because they provide individuals with ade-
quate notice regarding prohibited behavior and contain proper police
guidelines to regulate enforcement. 7' Although this type of legislation
is not be unconstitutionally vague because it provides the requisite
notice, it is unconstitutionally overbroad if it prohibits innocent, unof-
fending conduct that is beyond the state's police power to regulate. 72
In Kent v. Dulles,7 a for example, the Court emphasized that "[o]ur
nation ... has thrived on the principle that, outside areas of plainly
harmful conduct, every American is left to shape his own life as he
thinks best, do what he pleases, go where he pleases."'74 Similarly, the
Papachristou Court, criticized vagrancy statutes for making criminal
certain activities that are "normally innocent" by modem standards. 75
The Court specifically condemned the ordinance's prohibitions
against "nightwalking, "76 against "persons ... living off the earnings
of their wives or minor children, ' 77 and against persons "neglecting
all lawful business and habitually spending their time by frequenting
... places where alcoholic beverages are sold or served."' 7 The Court
was concerned that these prohibitions might implicate the innocent,
unoffending conduct of insomniacs, the legitimately unemployed, and
even members of country clubs, respectively.79
70. See supra note 7-8.
71. See Hershey v. City of Clearwater, 834 F.2d 937 (11th Cir. 1987) (upholding
ordinance prohibiting sleeping in motor vehicles because it provided "proper and precise
notice of the conduct prohibited"); Seeley v. State, 134 Ariz. 263, 655 P.2d 803 (Ct. App.
1982) (finding an ordinance prohibiting "lying, sleeping or otherwise remaining in a sitting
position" on a street not unconstitutionally vague because it was "capable of being understood
by any individual"); People v. Davenport, 176 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 10, 222 Cal. Rptr. 736
(App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1985) (finding an ordinance prohibiting sleeping in a park after hours
unconstitutionally vague only if "vague in all of its applications". cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1141
(1986); People v. Trantham, 161 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 208 Cal. Rptr. 535 (App. Dep't Super.
Ct. 1984) (finding an ordinance prohibiting entry into a park from 10:30 P.M. to 5:00 A.M. not
vague when read as simply a park closure law).
72. See Fenster v. Leary, 20 N.Y.2d 309, 299 N.E.2d 426, 282 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1967)
(holding a vagrancy statute unconstitutional because it prohibited conduct of an individual
which in no way impinged upon rights or interests of others). Overbroad legislation may also
be invalidated if it prohibits constitutionally protected conduct. See Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (upholding an anti-noise ordinance because it did not prohibit
conduct protected under the first and fourteenth amendments).
73. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
74. Id. at 126 (quoting Z. CHAFEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF
1787, at 197 (1956)).
75. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 163 (1971).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 164.
79. Id. at 163-64.
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Recently, in City of Pompano Beach v. Capalbo,° a Florida
appellate court held an anti-homeless ordinance that prohibited sleep-
ing in a motor vehicle facially unconstitutional on two grounds. First,
the ordinance gave police "unbridled discretion," because many per-
sons who violate the ordinance, such as a child sleeping in a car seat
or a driver who is sleeping off inebriation, would never be arrested. 1
Second, the ordinance made criminal conduct that did not impinge on
the rights or interests of others.8 2 Other courts, however, have found
that laws prohibiting sleeping in motor vehicles or on public streets
are not overbroad because the over-inclusion is generally minor and,
thus, such narrow laws are within a city's broad police powers.83
The test to determine the legitimacy of a city's police power is
that police conduct must bear a reasonable relationship to an objec-
tive of the law.84 On a constitutional challenge, if the court finds that
"a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public
health, the public morals, or the public safety, has no real or substan-
tial relation to those objects[,] ... it is the duty of the court[ ] to so
adjudge, and thereby give effect to the constitution.
'85
The cases that have challenged the constitutionality of legisla-
tion, prohibiting sleeping in motor vehicles or in parks, have not
involved homeless defendants.8 6 Significant issues are raised, how-
ever, when local governments attempt to use narrowly drawn anti-
homeless legislation to prohibit homeless individuals from sleeping in
the streets and parks. As the following discussion will illustrate, not
80. 455 So. 2d 468 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 824 (1985).
81. Id. at 470.
82. Id. (quoting Lazarus v. Faircloth, 301 F. Supp. 266, 272 (S.D. Fla. 1969), vacated, 401
U.S. 987 (1971); see also State v. Penley, 276 So. 2d 180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (finding that
an ordinance that prohibited a person from sleeping in public made no distinction between
conduct calculated to harm and conduct that is essentially innocent).
83. See, e.g., Hershey v. City of Clearwater, 834 F.2d 937 (1 1th Cir. 1987). The Hershey
court upheld an ordinance prohibiting sleeping in motor vehicles because it did not attempt to
regulate a substantial amount of constitutionally protected activity; thus, it was a valid exercise
of the city's broad police powers. Id. at 940. Also, the court determined that it was possible to
construe the statute to give it a limiting effect to avoid overbreadth. Id. at 939; see also United
States v. Hogue, 752 F.2d 1503, 1505 (9th Cir. 1985) (upholding conviction under a park
regulation of a drunk driver who chose to sleep off the effects of alcohol, noting that "[t]he law
does not exonerate one who forces an election between evils and chooses the lesser of the
two"); Seeley v. State, 134 Ariz. 263, 655 P.2d 803 (Ct. App. 1982) (finding an ordinance
prohibiting sitting on a street not overbroad because the state had a valid reason for making
the conduct illegal).
84. See People v. Davenport, 176 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 10, 16, 222 Cal. Rptr. 736, 739 (App.
Dep't Super. Ct. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1141 (1986).
85. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887).
86. Hershey, 834 F.2d at 937 (involving a defendant who was resting in his car); People v.
Trantham, 161 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 208 Cal. Rptr. 535 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1984)
(involving a defendant who was using a park restroom after hours).
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only are these types of anti-homeless legislation unconstitutional for
prohibiting innocent conduct and for failing to be rationally related to
a legitimate state purpose, but they are a waste of limited city
resources as well.
In analyzing innocent conduct, it is self-evident that it is a bio-
logical necessity for all individuals to sleep. 7 By definition, however,
homeless persons lack a permanent residence and, thus, lack a regular
place to sleep. 8  Many homeless citizens do not have shelter avail-
able; 9 they have no other choice but to sleep outside. For others,
shelter options are available, but concerns for personal safety override
that alternative. 9° In any event, rather than being a crime, the home-
less person's act of sleeping outside constitutes completely innocent
conduct because it is an act of compulsion and harms no one.
Accordingly, under the Kent v. Dulles and Papachristou rationales, by
enforcing anti-homeless ordinances that prohibit sleeping in the
streets or parks, the state is unconstitutionally prohibiting innocent,
necessary conduct.91
In analyzing whether anti-homeless legislation is unconstitu-
tional for failure to advance a legitimate state interest, the court must
determine whether the police conduct bears a reasonable relationship
to the objective of the legislation. 92 Local governments have given
various rationales for exercising their police power to prohibit sleep-
ing in the streets and parks. These rationales include "protect[ing]
... the community from an increase in criminal behavior caused by
the transient population, ' 93 "protecting the sleeping transient as vic-
tim," '94 and conserving scarce city resources by restricting entrances
to parks between certain hours.95 The use of the police power in this
87. Toufexis, Drowsy America, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 17, 1990, at 78, 79 ("[S]leep is a
biological imperative.... A typical adult needs about eight hours of [sleep] a night to function
effectively.").
88. See Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11302(1) (1988)
(defining a homeless individual as a person lacking a "fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime
residence.").
89. See supra notes 10, 22-27, 38 & 49 and accompanying text.
90. See supra note 10.
91. For a review of those rationales, see Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); and
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1971).
92. People v. Davenport, 176 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 10, 16, 222 Cal. Rptr. 736, 739 (App.
Dep't Super. Ct. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1141 (1986).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment with Incorporated Memorandum of
Law at 10, Pottinger v. City of Miami, No. 88-2406 (S.D. Fla. filed Dec. 30, 1988) ("The city
argued that "[t]he City of Miami has the right to police its streets and regulate the use of its
parks for the good and benefit of all the citizenry and it should not be hampered in this regard
by the unfortunate needs and requirements of a relatively small group of persons."); see also
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way is ineffectual, however, in terms of eliminating what the local
government perceives as manifestations of homelessness. The "crime
control rationale" fails for two reasons. First, it is impossible for
homeless persons to commit crimes in their sleep. 96 Second, homeless
persons do not commit more crimes than the general population.97
The "protecting the homeless persons" rationale is also flawed
because homeless persons that are arrested for violating anti-homeless
legislation are simply removed from the streets for several hours and
then released.98 Hence, they are protected as potential victims only
for the short time that they are in custody. Instead of protecting
homeless persons, arresting them may just encourage them to relocate
to suburban areas where they lose the benefit of support from other
homeless individuals and from social service groups, both of which
are generally concentrated in urban areas. 99 Likewise, scarce govern-
mental resources, including funds, personnel, and property, are only
conserved for the several hours that homeless citizens are off the
streets. Ironically, enforcing these types of anti-homeless legislation
will actually result in a net loss of governmental resources when one
considers the aggregate costs of manpower used to sweep the streets
of homeless individuals day after day and process and prosecute them
in the criminal justice system.10° Certainly, legislators must realize
that, with no other options available, homeless persons likely will
return to the same streets and parks where they subsisted before being
arrested, only to repeat the cycle. Thus, the state interest in prohibit-
ing sleeping in the streets or parks is not sufficiently rationally related
to a legitimate state purpose. Therefore, anti-homeless legislation
should be adjudged unconstitutional.101 Local governments do not
People v. Trantham, 161 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 208 Cal. Rptr. 535 (App. Dep't Super. Ct.
1984) (finding a park closure law reasonable to protect city property).
96. Davenport, 176 Cal. App. 3d Supp. at 16, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 739.
97. See infra notes 233-38 and accompanying text.
98. Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, and Compensatory Relief/
Class Action at 6, Pottinger, (No. 88-2406). Homeless defendants are often "coerced" into
pleading guilty in exchange for time served. Id.
99. The Davenport court suggests that "the City acts reasonably in lessening the risks to
transients by restricting the areas where overnight sleeping, and thus vulnerability, can
legitimately take place." Davenport, 176 Cal. App. 3d Supp. at 17, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 739. The
problem with this rationale is that cities are not using such legislation to restrict homeless
persons to certain areas of the city; they are subject to arrest whenever they sleep outside.
100. For a discussion of using city resources in an alternative, productive manner to combat
homelessness, see infra notes 268-76 and accompanying text.
101. Advocates and commentators have posed several possible alternatives for finding laws
used to punish homeless individuals facially unconstitutional. Some advocates have argued
that homeless persons have a constitutionally protected right to remain on the streets because
sleep is a constitutionally protected activity. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence,
468 U.S. 288 (1984). The Court, however, held that the government may restrict sleeping in
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advance the public welfare by shielding either homeless persons or the
public at large from harm. Rather, legislation prohibiting sleeping in
the streets and parks bears no substantial relation to the protection of
public health, morals, or safety. These types of legislation actually
waste limited governmental resources by causing substantial expendi-
tures of public funds to remove homeless citizens from the streets and
parks on a daily basis rather than channeling those funds into effective
solutions to the homelessness crisis.
III. PUNISHMENT FOR AN INVOLUNTARY MANIFESTATION OF
HOMELESS STATUS
Advocates for homeless citizens have also relied on the eighth
amendment to invalidate anti-homeless legislation.102 They have
argued that legislation that prohibits sleeping in public or parks after
hours unconstitutionally punishes homeless persons for involuntary
manifestations of their homeless status. This Section sets forth the
background and development of the prohibition against punishing
public via reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions, and thus, such conduct is not
constitutionally protected under the first amendment. Id. at 293-99. The Court did not decide
whether sleeping in public was protected under the fourteenth amendment substantive due
process clause, which "protects substantive aspects of liberty against unconstitutional
restrictions by the state." See Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 244 (1976) (citing Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972)). Some commentators have argued that ordinances
used to police homeless citizens may violate a homeless person's right to travel. See Comment,
supra note 11, at 605-23. The right to privacy is another theory that might be used to establish
a constitutionally protected interest for homeless men and women to remain on the streets.
Justice Brandeis argued that all individuals enjoy a liberty interest derived from the "right to
be left alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."
Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled, Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). For a discussion of a case in which the Connecticut Supreme Court
held that the possessions of a homeless person are protected by the fourth amendment, even
though his "home" was technically a public place anyone could enter, see Johnson, Hartford
Court Rules Belongings of a Homeless Man Are Private, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1991, at 5A, ol.
1. In a simpler sense, punishment violates a homeless person's right to human dignity. See
Paust, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Right: A Jurisprudentially Based Inquiry into
Criteria and Content, 27 How. L.J. 145 (1984).
102. The eighth amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII. The
constitutional claim that homeless persons are being punished for involuntary manifestations
of their status is being advanced in Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief/Class
Action at 7-8, Pottinger v. City of Miami, No. 88-2406 (S.D. Fla. filed Dec. 30, 1988), and was
advanced both in Memorandum in Support of the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at
22-26, Thompson v. City of New Orleans, No. 85-5475 (E.D. La. filed May 27, 1986), and
Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants' Demurrer at
9-12, Manicom v. Burgreen, No. 613914 (Cal. Sup. Ct., San Diego Cty. filed Aug. 2, 1989).
For a discussion of the history and uses of the eighth amendment, see Ingraham v. Wright, 430
U.S. 651, 666 (1977).
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status, hereinafter referred to as the Robinson doctrine, 0 3 analyzes
the extension of this doctrine to encompass anti-homeless legislation,
and then discusses criticisms to the extension of the Robinson
doctrine.
A. Background: The Robinson Doctrine
In Robinson v. California,"° 4 the defendant was convicted for vio-
lating a California statute that made it a criminal offense for a person
to "be addicted to the use of narcotics." ' 5 The Court did not ques-
tion the state's power to regulate narcotics in the interest of public
health and welfare." ° Rather, it held the statute unconstitutional
because it allowed for conviction based on the defendant's "status" or
"chronic condition" of being "addicted to the use of narcotics."' 7
Robinson was the first reported decision in which the Court applied
the eighth amendment as a limitation upon state power and, more
importantly, invoked that amendment's ban on cruel and unusual
punishment against a statute's substantive provisions.108 The Court
compared conviction for narcotics addiction to conviction for mental
illness, leprosy, or affliction with venereal disease, maintaining that
these conditions require treatment-not punishment.109
103. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 660 n. 1. The California statute at issue provided as follows:
No person shall use, or be under the influence of, or be addicted to the use of
narcotics .... Any person convicted of violating any provision of this section is
guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be sentenced to serve a term of not less than 90
days nor more than one year in the county jail.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11721 (West 1975), repealed by 1972 CAL. STAT. 1407.
106. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 664. The state has the power to impose criminal sanctions for
possession, manufacture, and distribution of narcotics within its borders, as well as
compulsory treatment (including involuntary confinement) for persons addicted to narcotics.
The Court suggested that states implement a broader attack on narcotics using public health
education and amelioration of the economic and social conditions under which drug abuse
flourishes. Id. at 664-65.
107. Id. at 665. The Court implied that the statute would have been valid had it punished
the actual use, purchase, sale, or possession of narcotics within the State's borders, or had it
provided or required medical treatment for addiction. Id. at 664-65. The statute was
unconstitutional, however, because the punishment for the status of addiction allowed the state
to prosecute an addict "at any time before he reforms." Id. at 666. The Court also found the
statute repugnant to the constitution because it made it a crime to suffer from the illness of
narcotics addiction, "which may be contracted innocently or involuntarily." Id. at 667
(footnote omitted).
108. See Manes, Robinson v. California: A Farewell to Rationalism, 22 L. TRANSITION 238
(1962); Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the Substantive Criminal Law,
79 HARV. L. REv. 635, 645-46 (1966). For a summary of critiques of the Robinson decision,
see L. BERKSON, THE CONCEPT OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 98-99 (1975).
109. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666.
We hold that a state law which imprisons a person thus afflicted as a criminal,
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Commentators have suggested three constitutional rationales as
to why punishment of an illness is cruel and unusual.110 First, the law
may not punish a mere condition, but must address the acts of indi-
viduals. "' In Robinson, the Court confirmed that it was not address-
ing the state's ability to punish acts, such as the manufacture,
possession, or purchase of narcotics, 1 2 or to civilly confine an addict
for treatment.113 Instead, the Robinson Court was concerned with the
state's punishment of a person's "chronic condition" of "being
addicted to the use of narcotics."
' 1 4
The second rationale, termed the "status one cannot change"
argument,'15 involves the notion that "the victim cannot help himself;
once an individual has acquired a sickness, he is not free voluntarily
to quit his condition."' 16 Accordingly, a law that prohibits a sickness
even though he has never touched any narcotic drug within the State or been
guilty of any irregular behavior there, inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 667.
In his concurrence, Justice Douglas noted:
A punishment out of all proportion to the offense may bring it within the ban
against "cruel and unusual punishments." . . . Cruel and unusual punishment
results not from confinement, but from convicting the addict of a crime.... A
prosecution for addiction, with its resulting stigma and irreparable damage to the
good name of the accused, cannot be justified as a means of protecting society,
where a civil commitment would do as well .... This prosecution has no rela-
tionship to the curing of an illness.
Id. at 676-78 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Justice Douglas also emphasized the involuntary nature of drug addiction, criticizing
those who believe that addicts can simply choose to "forsake their evil ways." Id. at 669-70.
110. Note, supra note 108, at 646-55.
111. Id. at 646-47.
112. Id. at 664. The Court noted that:
There can be no question of the authority of the State in the exercise of its police
power to regulate the administration, sale, prescription and use of dangerous and
habit-forming drugs .... The right to exercise this power is so manifest in the
interest of the public health and welfare, that it is unnecessary to enter upon a
discussion of it beyond saying that it is too firmly established to be successfully
called in question.
Id. (quoting Whipple v. Martinson, 256 U.S. 41, 45 (1921)).
113. Id. at 664-65. The Court explained,
In the interest of discouraging the violation of [narcotics] laws, or in the interest
of the general health and welfare of its inhabitants, a State might establish a
program of compulsory treatment for those addicted to narcotics. Such a
program of treatment might require periods of involuntary confinement. And
penal sanctions might be imposed for failure to comply with established
compulsory treatment procedures.
Id. (footnote omitted).
114. Id at 665.
115. Id. at 648.
116. Id.
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can have no deterrent effect and is morally repugnant."17
The third rationale is that courts are reluctant to punish a person
for a condition that was contracted "innocently or involuntarily.""'
This rationale suggests, however, that if an individual consciously
chooses to experiment with drugs, he could be punished for his condi-
tion. Further, one who innocently or involuntarily acquired his
addiction could be punished for possession or use of drugs." 9
Advocates have argued persuasively that the prohibition against
punishing status applies to other criminal contexts besides addiction.
For example, in Wheeler v. Goodman, 20 a North Carolina federal dis-
trict court invalidated a statute that defined "vagrant" as a person
living in idleness or without visible means of support because it made
this unfortunate status criminal. 2 ' The court held that the statute
punished a person for his economic status without mens rea, 2 in vio-
lation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments.
23
Although some courts have extended the Robinson reasoning to
laws punishing public intoxication, 2 4 the Supreme Court refused to
117. Id. (criticizing this rational by noting that there is a significant difference between
addiction and most sicknesses; an individual, at least initially, made the choice to use
narcotics).
118. Id. (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962)). Justice Douglas
emphasized this point in Robinson by discussing how addiction can be acquired involuntarily
by infants at birth and as innocently as a "boy's puff on a cigarette in an alleyway." Robinson
v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 670 (1962).
119. For a judicial acknowledgment of the potential conflict in the Court's affirmation of
statutes prohibiting possession and the Court's prohibition of illness and involuntariness, see
Hutcherson v. United States, 345 F.2d 964, 977 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 894 (1965);
and Lloyd v. United States, 343 F.2d 242, 245 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 952
(1965).
For an argument that an addict's use of drugs should not be punished, see United States
ex rel. Swanson v. Reincke, 344 F.2d 260 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 869 (1965); and
Browne v. State, 24 Wis. 2d 491, 129 N.W.2d 175 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1004 (1965).
120. 306 F. Supp. 58 (W.D.N.C. 1969), vacated on other grounds, 401 U.S. 987 (1971)
121. Id. at 62.
122. For a discussion of mens rea, see infra notes 200-05.
123. Wheeler, 306 F. Supp. at 62. The Wheeler court also criticized the statute on equal
protection grounds. It noted that the statute did not punish persons who own property and,
therefore, are able to live idly, while it did punish persons who have neither property nor jobs,
regardless of whether employment is available. "To make poverty and misfortune criminal is
contrary to our fundamental beliefs, and to arrest and prosecute a person under this statute
violates the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 62; see also Farber v. Rochford, 407 F. Supp.
529, 533-34 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (invalidating an ordinance that punished individuals "known to
be" a prostitute or narcotics addict); Goldman v. Knecht, 295 F. Supp. 897, 907-08 (D. Colo.
1969) (invalidating a statute prohibiting loitering by any "able-bodied" person); State v. Pugh,
369 So. 2d 1308, 1309-10 (La. 1979) (invalidating a vagrancy statute aimed against "habitual
drunkards").
124. See Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Driver v. Hinnant,
356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966).
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do so in Powell v. Texas. 2 ' In Powell, the defendant argued that
because he was a chronic alcoholic, "his appearance in public while
drunk was not of his own volition," and that, therefore, his punish-
ment would be a violation of the eighth and fourteenth amend-
ments. 126 The Court rejected this argument noting that the defendant
was convicted for the voluntary act of being in public while drunk,
not for the status of being a chronic alcoholic. ' 27 The Court's analysis
rested on the defendant's ability to have made the choice to drink at
home. ' 28
Justice White's concurrence recognized that although it was con-
stitutionally permissible to punish an alcoholic who has a home, and
hence, has an opportunity not to be drunk in public, it would be
unconstitutional to punish a homeless alcoholic for drinking in public:
The fact remains that some chronic alcoholics must drink and
hence must drink somewhere. Although many chronics have
homes, many others do not. For all practical purposes the public
streets may be home for these unfortunates, not because their dis-
ease compels them to be there, but because, drunk or sober, they
have no place else to go and no place else to be when they are
drinking. This is more a function of economic station than of dis-
ease, although the disease may lead to destitution and perpetuate
that condition. For some of these alcoholics I would think a show-
ing could be made that resisting drunkenness is impossible and that
avoiding public places when intoxicated is also impossible. As
applied to them this statute is in effect a law which bans a single
act for which they may not be convicted under the Eighth Amend-
ment-the act of getting drunk.
129
Justice White's argument that an act cannot be punished if it
cannot be avoided reveals the Court's differentiation between a crime
requiring an act and the prohibition of a particular status. Other
125. 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (echoing the voluntary/involuntary and act/non-act distinction).
126. Id. at 517.
127. Id. at 532.
128. Id. at 535.
129. Id. at 551 (White, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). Justice Fortas, writing for the
dissent, argued that:
Robinson stands upon the principle that.., is the foundation of individual liberty
and the cornerstone of the relations between a civilized state and its citizens:
Criminal penalties may not be inflicted upon a person for being in a condition he
is powerless to change. In all probability, Robinson at some time before his
conviction elected to take narcotics. But the crime as defined did not punish this
conduct. The statute imposed a penalty for the offense of "addiction"-a
condition which Robinson could not control. Once Robinson had become an
addict, he was utterly powerless to avoid criminal guilt. He was powerless to
choose not to violate the law.
Id. at 567 (Fortas, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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attempts to extend the Robinson doctrine-that is, the notion of status
criminality-beyond punishment for sociomedical or economic
problems generally have not been successful.1 30  One rationale for
courts' reluctance to extend the Robinson doctrine stems from the fear
that it would be difficult to delimit truly involuntary offenses. 13' In
Perkins v. North Carolina, 32 for example, a homosexual defendant
attempted to apply the Robinson doctrine to sodomy statutes. 33 A
North Carolina federal district court refused to find that the defend-
ant was being punished for his status as a homosexual and upheld the
conviction because the defendant had been "convicted of an overt
act."' 134 Another rationale for courts' refusal to extend the doctrine is
that the Supreme Court has never discussed fully the standards relat-
ing to actus reus (the physical element of a crime) and mens rea (the
mental element of a crime). 135  In Watson v. United States,136 for
instance, a narcotics addict, arrested for possessing a small amount of
heroin, claimed that Robinson precluded punishment of an addict for
possession of narcotics for personal use.'37 The Watson court rejected
the defendant's argument, distinguishing punishment for possession of
narcotics from punishment for being addicted to narcotics, 31 which
the Robinson Court found unconstitutional. 39  The Watson court
explained its reticence to find that the eighth amendment precluded
punishment of an addict for possession of narcotics as follows:
130. "The doctrine of involuntariness as part of a constitutional view of a criminal
responsibility has completely stagnated. The few cases in the area have been relegated to
isolated examples primarily dealing with the punishment of sociomedical problems like drug
addiction and chronic alcoholism." Sundby, The Reasonable Doubt Rule and the Meaning of
Innocence, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 457, 478 (1989).
131. The Powell majority was reticent to extend the use of the eighth amendment to public
intoxication for two reasons: (1) the lack of data demonstrating that alcoholism is a disease;
and (2) the difficulty in placing limits on which offenses are truly involuntary. The second
rationale is discussed in W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW § 2.14, at 183 (abr. 2d. ed.
1986). The authors explain that if possession and use of narcotics are inevitable for the addict,
then perhaps the commission of offenses which supply the funds necessary for the continued
use of narcotics, such as robbery, may similarly be inevitable. Id. The Powell dissent disagrees
with LaFave and Scott, arguing that there are definable limits. The dissent noted that there is
no constitutional bar on conviction for crimes such as theft and robbery because such crimes
"are not part of the syndrome of the disease of chronic alcoholism." Powell, 392 U.S. at 559
n.2 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
132. 234 F. Supp. 333 (W.D.N.C. 1964).
133. Id. at 336-37.
134. Id at 337.
.135. For a discussion of actus reus and mens rea, see infra notes 197-205 and accompanying
text.
136. 439 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
137. Id. at 446.
138. Id. at 447.
139. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
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[T]he Supreme Court in Powell has left th[e] matter of criminal
responsibility, as affected by the Eighth Amendment, in a posture
which is, at best, obscure. The majority in [Powell] unmistakably
recoiled from opening up new avenues of escape from criminal
accountability by reason of the compulsions of such things as alco-
holism and, presumably, drug addiction-conditions from which it
is still widely assumed, rightly or wrongly, that the victim retains
some capacity to liberate himself. In any event,... Powell at the
least contemplates a heavy burden of proof on one who claims to
the contrary.' 4°
B. Applying the Robinson Doctrine to Homelessness
Despite most courts' reluctance to extend Robinson beyond a
very limited set of circumstances, the Robinson doctrine can be cau-
tiously expanded to encompass other crimes involving involuntary
manifestations of a particular status. The Robinson doctrine can
effectively be limited to make it manageable and, therefore, palat-
able."14 As Justice White explained in his Powell concurrence, a
chronic alcoholic without a home cannot avoid being drunk in public;
thus, under the eighth amendment, he cannot be prosecuted for public
intoxication.142 Following this analysis, it is equally violative of the
eighth amendment to prosecute a homeless person for involuntary
manifestations of his status, such as sleeping, bathing, urinating, or
residing in the streets or in parks after hours. Congress has defined a
homeless individual as one who lacks a fixed, regular, and adequate
nighttime residence or has a primary nighttime residence in a shelter,
an institution, or a place not normally used as a regular sleeping
accommodation for human beings. 4 3 As Congress' definition of a
homeless person illustrates, the status of being homeless is inextrica-
bly linked with the manifestations of that status. The definition
emphasizes that the lack of a fixed, adequate place to sleep is central
140. Watson, 439 F.2d at 451. The dissent disagreed, arguing that "Powell should be read
not as a bar, but as an exhortation toward further experiment with common-law doctrines of
criminal responsibility." Id. at 459 (Bazelon, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part
141. See supra note 131. In applying the Robinson doctrine to homeless people, the
involuntary manifestations of their status would include sleeping on the streets, begging for
food, defecating in public, and staying in parks after hours. Involuntary manifestations would
not include breaking into a home to sleep or stealing to earn money to pay for housing. Even
though the notion of sleeping on the streets (or in the subway) is appalling to most individuals,
it is still an option available to homeless persons. Thus, the direct invasion of another's private
property should not be included as an involuntary manifestation of the status of homelessness.
Perhaps the result would be different if a homeless man or woman faced freezing temperatures
or starvation.
142. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 551 (1968) (White, J., concurring).
143. Stewart B. McKinney Homelss Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11302(a) (1988).
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to defining one as being homeless. To punish a person for not having
an adequate place to sleep, then, is equivalent to punishing that indi-
vidual for being homeless.
This analogy to Justice White's Powell concurrence assumes that
homeless people are involuntarily without a residence."' Based on
two factors-the reported dearth of affordable housing and available
emergency shelter in the United States'45 and the difficulties that
homeless persons experience in attempting to obtain employment to
help them leave the streets 4 -involuntary homelessness is a reality.
For example, in Dade County (Miami), Florida, 20,700 units were
removed from the housing stock between 1979 and 1983."4" During
the same period, the percentage of renters in Dade County paying
more than thirty-five percent of their income for rent increased from
thirty-nine to forty-nine percent.'48 Further, four out of five of the
over five thousand homeless persons in Dade County are without even
temporary shelter.'49 Although some critics charge that homeless
individuals could simply "get a job," and earn their way off the
streets, 5 ° this assertion ignores the twenty-four percent of homeless
144. The vast majority of homeless individuals are on the streets involuntarily. See supra
notes 24-27 & 148 and accompanying text for an account of the tremendous shortage of public
housing in the United States. See supra note 10 for an account of the dangers present in many
shelters and for a description of shelter rules that require shelter residents vacate the shelter's
premises during daytime hours. Very few homeless individuals bring to mind Justice Douglas'
romantic notions of wanderers. See supra note 59.
145. See supra notes 24-27 & 148 and accompanying text.
146. See Rule, supra note 17, at L3, col. I (describing the rise in Britain's anarchist
movement, fueled in part by difficult economic conditions). One homeless man, William Dean,
discussed his frustration in attempting to secure employment:
The people in government should be doing something for us but they don't want
to do anything. They think that we just got to put up with it. But you get angry
when you can't get a job without an address and someplace to live and you can't
get someplace to live unless you got a job.
Id. at L3, col. 2.
147. MIAMI COALITION FOR CARE TO THE HOMELESS, supra note 2, at 3 (citing data from
a United States census survey).
148. Id. at 4-5. In 1983, 25% of Miami renters were paying over 60% of their income for
rent. Id. at 5. Public housing agencies meet only 42.5% of the demand for low-cost housing in
South Florida. Id..
149. Dliuhy, How to Help Dade County's Homeless, Miami Herald, Jan. 13, 1991, at IC, col.
1.
150. See Buckley, supra note 45, at B5, col. 5 (One homeless person panhandling in
Washington, D.C., "said he gets angry 'when people say, "You're big, you're healthy, go get a
job." Why don't they say, "Son, you want to work? I know where you can get a job," even if
it's mowing lawns or digging ditches or fixing cars.' "); Jaynes, Intense Nights in a Cold
Shanty on Sixth Street, N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1987, at BI, col. 1 (Michael Cruzado, a former
construction foreman, now homeless man living in a plywood shack in New York City noted,
"I'd tell panhandlers to get a job, but when I lost mine I found out: share what you've got,
every little bit.").
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citizens who already have full or part-time jobs. 1 ' An additional
group of the homeless population is chronically unemployed,' 5 2 and
an estimated twenty-five percent of homeless persons are mentally
ill,153 for whom ordinary employment is not plausible. 54 A wage
earner in Miami, for example, would have to earn about seven dollars
per hour in order to be able to afford even the poorest quality housing,
and such jobs are simply unavailable. 55 Finally, ordinary employ-
ment is not possible for the estimated forty-four percent of homeless
people who are substance abusers, 56 until they have been rehabili-
tated. 57  In any event, under Robinson, the circumstances under
151. See supra note 19. One must often pay first and last month's rent and one month's
security deposit to obtain housing. In Miami, Florida, for example, such deposits average $650
for an individual and $790 for a family. Dluhy, supra note 149, at 6C, col. I. Many
Americans cannot afford these expenses. In addition, countless Americans are simply one or
two paychecks away from becoming homeless. For example, millions of Americans have no
health insurance. "In one 28 month period spanning 1985 through 1987, 28% of Americans
were covered (with health insurance] for less than the full 28 months. Among 18- to 24-year-
olds, however, 52% suffered from interruptions in coverage." Passell, supra note 37, at D2,
col. 1. For an individual employed by a small business that offers no medical benefits, the
effects of an illness can be catastrophic. The effects may cause the individual to use any
accumulated savings to pay for medical assistance. Consequently, they may be forced to miss
rent payments, and possibly be evicted. It is then a short step to homelessness. The effects of
being laid off from work can be similarly devastating.
152. The American economy has 5.6% unemployment. See Hershey, Job Growth Hits a
Standstill, While Unemployment Rises, N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1990, at Al, col. 1. The statistics
for blacks are even more grim: Blacks face unemployment rates of 11.8%. A certain
percentage of this unemployment has been termed "chronic unemployment," encompassing
individuals who are, quite simply, "unemployable." The Labor Department reported that
45,000 factory jobs were lost in August 1990, bringing the aggregate between January and
August 1990 to 455,000; 40,000 construction jobs were lost in August 1990, bringing the total
factory jobs lost between June and August 1990 to 100,000. Id. at A10, col. 4. As the film
Roger & Me, so aptly demonstrated, one cannot tell an unemployed auto worker in Flint,
Michigan to "get a job." See Roger & Me (Warner Brothers 1989).
153. See supra note 15.
154. Some of these individuals could be gainfully employed in certain occupations.
However, they still require some care and counseling and generally cannot take care of
themselves entirely. Deinstitutionalization has been widely criticized because it did not
provide essential outpatient care facilities. See McCoy, supra note 15, at 265.
155. Dluhy, supra note 149, at 6C, cols. 1-2.
156. See supra note 16.
157. Ordinary employment is not available because the substance abuser is a slave to his
addiction, and therefore is generally not responsible enough to hold regular employment for
any length of time. Also, with a growing number of employers screening employees with drug
tests, it becomes more difficult for substance abusers to obtain gainful employment. See
Behrens, The Limits: The Right to Privacy vs Drug-Free America, Newsday, Jan. 13. 1989, at
2, col. 1. In 1988, 50% of the Fortune 500 companies had drug-testing programs, an increase
from roughly 5% in 1982. Id. at 3, col. 5. A Labor Department survey of 7,500 private
employers indicated that one of every 100 American workers was tested for drug use in 1988.
Id. at 5, col. 1. Some policymakers have proposed drug testing of public assistance recipients.
See Drug Testing Is Urged for Welfare Recipients, Chicago Tribune Wire, Aug. 3, 1989
(LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file) (A Milwaukee, Wisconsin city official proposed drug testing
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which an individual becomes homeless 15 and the possibility that he
may someday overcome that status is irrelevant.1 59 Rather, the key
issue is whether the homeless person is involuntarily homeless-that
is, whether he is able to effect an immediate change in his homeless
status. 160 As the statistics demonstrate, most homeless persons have
no hope of effecting even a short-term change in their homeless status.
C. Criticisms to the Extension of the Robinson Doctrine to
Homelessness
1. PROHIBITION OF OVERT ACTS
Some advocates argue that anti-homeless legislation is constitu-
tional because it prohibits overt, voluntary acts, 16 1 as distinguished
from legislation that prohibits a certain status, which the Court found
unconstitutional in Robinson. '62 The overt acts prohibited, for exam-
ple, include falling asleep in public, littering, urinating in public, or
seeking shelter in a park after hours. Based on Robinson, in which the
Court noted that it was within a state's police power to prohibit the
use and possession of narcotics to protect the public health and wel-
fare, local governments have argued that it is within their police
power to prohibit overt acts of homelessness.
163
The overt acts in question, however, are essential to the homeless
persons' survival. Although one might argue that a narcotics addict
exercises some free will every time he chooses to use narcotics, a
homeless individual does not exercise discretion in deciding to sleep,
eat, drink, or excrete. All individuals are compelled to engage in
these, basic life sustaining activities. In other words, the homeless per-
son's acts of falling asleep in the street or being in a park after hours
for recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC")). Finally, there are
simply not enough rehabilitation programs available for the substance abusers. See Davidson
supra note 32, at 1, col. 1.
158. Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants'
Demurrer at 11, Manicom v. Burgreen, No. 613914 (Cal. Sup. Ct., San Diego Cty. filed Aug.
2, 1989) (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962)) (arguing that it was
irrelevant to the Court's decision that the drug addict could have altered his status by seeking
treatment).
159. Id. (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962)) (arguing that although
the Robinson Court noted that addiction can be voluntarily or involuntarily acquired, the
Court did not inquire into how Robinson became addicted).
160. Id.
161. Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment with Incorporated Memorandum of
Law at 1-2, Pottinger v. City of Miami, No. 88-2406 (S.D. Fla. filed Dec. 30, 1988).
162. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
163. Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment with Incorporated Memorandum of
Law at 10, Pottinger (No. 88-2406).
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are not overt, 64 and therefore, under the Robinson doctrine they are
not acts for which the homeless individual can be prosecuted.
In enforcing anti-homeless legislation, police argue that they can-
not be expected to differentiate between homeless and non-homeless
individuals. 65 Yet, in the vast majority of cases, it is only homeless
persons who commit offenses like sleeping in the streets, urinating in
public, or remaining in parks after hours. 66 When homeless individ-
uals sleep outside, and bathe and eat in public, they do so to survive
and in doing so are simply manifesting their homeless status. To pun-
ish homeless men and women for manifestations of their status is
nothing less than punishing them for their underlying homeless status
of homelessness.
Admittedly, courts must define the limits to this doctrine of
involuntary action so that the rights of homeless individuals not to be
prosecuted for involuntary acts are balanced against the rights of indi-
viduals to be secure in their homes and to protect their property.
Crimes such as a hungry person stealing to eat or a cold person tres-
passing to stay warm involve more difficult threshold questions.
67
These criminal acts, however, differ from sleeping on the streets or in
parks. Sleeping in public is integrally part of the status of homeless-
ness and is behavior for which the harm to the public is not out-
weighed by the need and rights of the homeless individuals. 61
164. Aristotle believed that conduct due to compulsion is involuntary and that blame is
only appropriate for voluntary acts. Bayles, Reconceptualizing Necessity and Duress, 33
WAYNE L. REV. 1191, 1193 (1987). For further discussion of the voluntary act requirement of
the criminal law, see infra Section IV.
165. "A police officer working a beat on a busy urban street can hardly be expected to
determine ... whether or not the person he questions or arrests is 'homeless.'" Order on
Application for a Preliminary Injunction at 4, Pottinger, (No. 88-2406).
166. Persons with homes or other available shelter do not need to sleep in the streets or in
parks, or to bathe or eat in public.
167. For a discussion of the justification/necessity defense, see supra notes 209-14 and
accompanying text.
168. In discussing relief from criminal sanctions for homeless persons and its relationship to
both private property interests and public health and welfare interests, the balance in favor of
homeless individuals is stronger, and qualitatively different, than the balance under similar
arguments regarding drug addicts. First, when examining voluntary actions, it is clear that
acts of theft, whether by a homeless person or a narcotics addict, threaten private property
interests and should not be condoned. When examining involuntary actions, however, one
needs to weigh the state's interest in protecting the public from harm against the harm that
would be inflicted on the sanctioned individual by the regulation. This balancing must occur
because an individual acting involuntarily has no choice but to have acted in a particular
manner. Thus, it is in the public interest for the state to criminally sanction a drug addict for
the use of drugs because the potential for violence or harm to the general public outweighs the
harm that would be inflicted on the addict by criminal sanctions. See supra notes 106 & 112.
Conversely, the state should not be able to criminally sanction a homeless person's use of
public property (parks and streets) for engaging in life-sustaining activities. The homeless
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Although local governments have an interest in maintaining their
sidewalks and parks for the public benefit, to paraphrase Justice
White in his Powell concurrence, the homeless population exists and
must continue to exist somewhere.1 69 Accordingly, the public interest
cannot outweigh the rights of homeless men and women to sleep in
public places until some viable alternatives develop for these individu-
als. Rather than punishing homeless persons for involuntary manifes-
tations of their status, the most promising way to attack homelessness
is "to ameliorate the economic and social conditions under which [the
problem] . . . flourish[es]."'' 70  Otherwise, punishment of homeless
individuals for sleeping in public violates "the common standards of
decency",-one of the important rationales of the eighth amend-
ment-by becoming "punishment that is disproportionately severe in
relation to the susceptibility to deterrence and moral fault of the
offender."' 
7'
2. IMPROPER APPLICATION OF THE PROTECTIONS
OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
Some advocates have argued 7 1 that because homeless arrestees
are usually released prior to receiving a formal adjudication of
guilt, ' 73 the eighth amendment's protection against punishment based
on status should not apply. 74  Simply put, they argue that without
person's right to survive exceeds the state's interest in protecting the public's ability to use
parks and streets. Similarly, homeless persons should not be criminally sanctioned when they
impair merchants' private property interests (their economic livelihood through their ability to
attract customers) by sleeping on merchants' doorsteps. Again, the right of the homeless
person to engage in life-sustaining activities outweighs these incidental private property
interests.
This is not to say that the public and merchants are not without redress. Their redress
should come from the government in the form of a long-term solution to the problem of
homelessness. In the interim, a short-term solution in the form of an arrest-free zone in certain
areas of the city and/or certain parks which are open to homeless persons may be appropriate.
These areas could be supplied with portable bathroom facilities and staffed with community
outreach personnel. See infra notes 268-76.
169. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 551 (1968) (White, J., concurring).
170. Id. at 665.
171. Note, supra note 108, at 649.
172. See, e.g., Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment with Incorporated
Memorandum of Law at 2, Pottinger v. City of Miami, No. 88-2406 (S.D. Fla. filed Dec. 30,
1988).
173. In many situations, homeless defendants are not given the benefit of a trial and the
ability to raise any defenses to their arrests; rather, they are arrested, brought to jail, processed,
and released in exchange for time served. Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory,
Injunctive, and Compensatory Relief/Class Action at 6, Pottinger (No. 88-2406).
174. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S! 520, 535 n.16 (1979) (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430
U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (1977)). Bell involved questions of condition of confinement for certain
pretrial detainees. The Bell Court held that a person who has been lawfully committed to
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adjudication, there can be no question of improper punishment. This
argument is without merit. First, cases based on status and determin-
ing the propriety of treatment of pre-adjudicated detainees involve the
substantive provisions of the eighth amendment, 75 not the penalties
imposed by it.17 6 Accordingly, it is not essential to have a formal
adjudication of guilt to challenge a statute that makes status a crimi-
nal offense.
Second, in cases involving the arrest of homeless individuals for a
violation of anti-homeless legislation, the state retains the power to
punish despite the lack of a final adjudication of guilt. This is signifi-
cant because the eighth amendment applies to a particular case once
the state acquires the power to punish. 177 In most criminal cases, "[a]
state does not acquire the power to punish . . . until after it has
secured a formal adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process
of law."' 178 In cases involving homeless persons, however, the state
acquires this crucial power to punish although it has not obtained a
formal adjudication of guilt. 79 The homeless individual is incarcer-
ated upon arrest and remains incarcerated until he pleads guilty, goes
to trial, or is simply released without a trial. When he is released in
exchange for his time served, his pretrial incarceration becomes his
ultimate punishment, although at the time he was incarcerated, there
was no final adjudication of guilt. Not permitting homeless defend-
ants to utilize the eighth amendment's protection against punishment
based on status would be unfair, because the homeless person gener-
ally has no realistic choice but to plead guilty.18 0 He faces an option
of either remaining in jail until a trial takes place' or of being
released immediately by pleading guilty. 82 In effect, this is no option
pretrial detention has not been adjudged guilty of any crime; therefore, such pretrial detention
cannot involve questions of punishment. Id. at 536.
175. See Hamm v. DeKab County, 774 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1096 (1986).
176. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
177. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (1977).
178. Id.
179. Legal punishment is considered generally to involve a system of threats which
demonstrates that if legal rules are violated, unpleasant consequences will follow for the
violator. H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 34-61 (1968); E. PINCOFFS,
THE RATIONALE OF LEGAL PUNISHMENT 56-58 (1966).
180. In the alternative, the fourteenth amendment could be utilized, because "[w]here the
State seeks to impose punishment without such an adjudication, the pertinent constitutional
guarantee is the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Ingraham, 430 U.S. at
671 n.40.
181. These individuals cannot afford to make bail.
182. That the ordinance with which they have been accused of violating is considered a
misdemeanor and, therefore, not deserving of utilization of the full resources of the criminal
justice system is irrelevant.
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because it puts the homeless person, who is in need of protection, at
the mercy of the criminal justice system. To prohibit the homeless
individual from utilizing the eighth amendment to protect him from
punishment by incarceration is to champion form over substance.
Consequently, the homeless individual is haunted by a criminal rec-
ord and the stigma of arrest for the rest of his life. Indeed, this crimi-
nal record may increase the gravity of later punishment if he is
arrested again.1 8 3  As Justice Stewart stated, in emphasizing the
importance of evaluating the relative weights of various punishments:
"[I]mprisonment for ninety days is not, in the abstract, a punishment
which is either cruel or unusual. But the question cannot be consid-
ered in the abstract. Even one day in prison would be a cruel and
unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold."'1
8 4
For homeless men and women, a mere arrest and release without
trial is cruel and unusual punishment. The arrest process displaces
the homeless individual (often in the middle of the night), and causes
him to lose his meager belongings. He is subjected to humility and
degradation while being processed and held, and then is subjected to a
criminal process that he often does not understand. Upon his even-
tual release, he is forced to return on foot to the area where he resides,
despite his poor physical condition. Ultimately, he is inevitably stig-
matized with the taint of a criminal record.'85 Again, this "punish-
ment" is within the coverage of the eighth amendment' 8 6 because it
violates "the common standards of decency" by being "disproportion-
ately severe in relation to the susceptibility to deterrence and moral
fault of the offender."'
' 87
183. Many states include a defendant's past criminal record as one of the criteria for
sentencing. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 921.005 (1)(b)(6) (1989) (instructing courts to consider a
defendant's prior criminal background in determining whether to withhold a sentence of
imprisonment). In addition, it is much more difficult for an individual with a criminal record
to obtain employment.
184. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
185. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970) (Criminal conviction "stigmatize[s]" a
defendant because of its "moral force."); United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 615 (2d Cir.
1966) (Conviction is "an expression of the moral sense of the community.").
186. The constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment serves societal
values as follows:
[The prohibition rests on] considerations of human decency. Punishment is
ordinarily justified under a utilitarian theory as being necessary for the
achievement of a long range benefit. But no matter how great the benefit
produced . .. there are standards of decency that may not be violated in
punishing a lawbreaker. Not only is the offender's own human dignity at stake,
but the standards of humanity embodied in any notion of society limit the
methods of punishment that society can conscionably impose.
Note supra note 93, at 635.
187. Note, supra note 108, at 649.
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III. JUSTIFICATION, EXCUSE, AND MORALITY
In addition to the constitutional challenges to the validity of anti-
homeless legislation, homeless persons should be able to assert the
criminal law doctrines of justification and excuse as defenses to their
"crimes." Further, in examining the underlying bases for criminal
punishment, local governments should be barred from prosecuting
and punishing homeless persons for engaging in life-sustaining activi-
ties based on morality grounds because such punishment does not fur-
ther the purposes of criminal punishment. This Section first discusses
the requirements of both a physical and mental act in the commission
of a crime, and then discusses justification, excuse, and morality.
In Powell v. Texas, 188 Justice Marshall emphasized that "[t]he
doctrines of actus reus, mens rea, insanity, mistake, justification and
duress have historically provided the tools for a constantly shifting
adjustment of the tension between the evolving aims of the criminal
law and changing religious, moral, philosophical, and medical views
of the nature of man."1"9 Although the courts have never thoroughly
developed these concepts into a workable model for legal advocates,
these doctrines provide a basis for arguing that criminal law justifica-
tion and excuse provide defenses to homeless persons for violation of
anti-homeless legislation."9 Judge Bazelon's separate opinion in Wat-
son v. United States,'9 ' suggests that a test of accountability for crimi-
nal conduct derives from "traditional doctrines of duress and
involuntary actions."1 92 Some commentators stress that moral con-
siderations enter into the test of accountability for criminal conduct:
Whatever one's position on whether moral or legal responsibility
are logically related, it is a plain fact that in practice our criminal
law is such that people are generally held criminally responsible
only when they would also be held morally responsible. Such an
overlap between moral and criminal responsibility is supported by
practical as well as moral considerations: Only a criminal law that
incorporated to some extent the morality of the society it was sup-
posed to serve, could hope to endure and effectively achieve general
deterrence and the other societal benefits that are thought to justify
criminal punishment.1 93
188. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
189. Id. at 536.
190. Fletcher, The Unmet Challenge of Criminal Theory, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1439, 1439-41
(1987).
191. 439 F.2d 442, 464-75 (1970) (Bazelon, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
192. Id. at 469.
193. Vuoso, Background, Responsibility and Excuse, 96 YALE L.J. 1661, 1663 n.8 (1987)
(citing the following cases among others: Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952)
("[C]ourts of various jurisdictions.., have sought to protect those who were not blameworthy
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This leads to the conclusion that "it is morally wrong to punish some-
one who has not done something for which he is morally blamewor-
thy." 19 4 Judge Bazelon argued that a "law's aims must be achieved by
a moral process cognizant of the realities of social injustice" 95 and
that "no act should be made criminal if it is not viewed as
immoral."
196
Two of the basic principles of criminal conduct include actus
reus and mens rea. 197 Actus reus embodies the requirement of a vol-
untary act for behavior to be treated as criminal.1 98 "Bad thoughts
alone cannot constitute a crime; there must be an act, or an omission
to act where there is a legal duty to act. Thus, the common law
crimes are defined in terms of act or omission to act and statutory
crimes are unconstitutional unless so defined." 199 Mens rea involves
the notion that "conduct is criminal only if the actor is aware of the
facts making it so.
''200
[T]o punish conduct without reference to the actor's state of mind
is both inefficacious and unjust. It is inefficacious because conduct
unaccompanied by an awareness of the factors making it criminal
does not mark the actor as one who needs to be subjected to pun-
ishment in order to deter him or others from behaving similarly in
the future, nor does it single him out as a socially dangerous indi-
vidual who needs to be incapacitated or reformed. It is unjust
because the actor is subjected to the stigma of criminal punishment
without being morally blameworthy.3°
Mens rea is generally not thought to be required for public welfare or
regulatory offenses (often called strict liability offenses) because the
in mind from conviction of infamous common-law crimes."); United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d
1139, 1240-41 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Wright J., dissenting) ("The concept of criminal responsibility
is, by its very nature, 'an expression of the moral sense of the community.' ") (quoting United
States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 615 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 980 (1973)); and
Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665, 666-67 (D.C. Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 852
(1948) ("Our collective conscience does not allow punishment where it cannot impose
blame.")).
194. Id. at 1663.
195. Bazelon, Morality of the Criminal Law, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 385, 386 (1976). But cf
Morse, The Twilight of Welfare Criminology.- A Reply to Judge Bazelon, 49 S. CAL. L. REV.
1247 (1976) (arguing that Judge Bazelon's view of law-and-order advocates as amoral is
incorrect and that his solutions to problems of social justice are unrealistic).
196. Bazelon, supra note 195, at 387.
197. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.01-.02 (1962).
198. See id. § 2.01; W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 131, § 3.1, at 193; G. WILLIAMS,
CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART § 1-13, at 1-29 (2d ed. 1961).
199. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 131, § 3.2, at 195.
200. Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 107, 108; see also
MODEL PENAL CODE. supra note 197, § 2.02 ("[A] person is not guilty of an offense unless he
acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently . . .
201. Packer, supra note 200, at 109.
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penalties for violation are relatively minor and the conduct is sought
to be controlled for reasons of public health or safety.2 °2 In addition,
public injury in these cases will occur irrespective of the actor's
intentions.20 3
Where criminal sanctions are applied, however, even in the case
of public welfare crimes, the concept of mens rea should not be dis-
carded, and defendants should be entitled to use the traditional
defenses to mens rea, such as justification and excuse:
204
[A] civil offense [encompassing public welfare and regulatory
offenses] has its own peculiar mens rea which requires, not culpa-
bility, but at least a mind that is not too young and not too greatly
affected by mental disorder or compulsion, plus a degree of fault in
that the actus reus could have been avoided by some method which
it is not against good conscience to require under all the
circumstances.205
For homeless individuals, being arrested for violations of anti-home-
less legislation causes displacement from their usual environs, subjec-
tion to a harsh criminal justice system, incarceration for several
hours, and the stigma of an arrest and a criminal record. Collectively,
the consequences of the homeless person's arrest result in "severe"
punishment, especially in relation to the severity of the offense.
Because of the criminal sanctions involved, homeless persons should
be able to assert the defenses to mens rea
Excuse and justification are defenses that "exculpate an actor
because of his blamelessness. ' 20 6 The difference between the defenses
202. See R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, THE CRIMINAL LAW 899 (3d ed. 1982); Packer, supra
note 20Q at 140, 146-47.
203. R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 202, at 905.
204. Packer, supra note 200, at 146-47.
[T]here is a conspicuous lack of authority explicitly considering and avowing the
propriety of distinctively "criminal" sanctions as applied to minor infractions.
On the contrary, these offenses have been treated as something different from
traditional criminal law, as a kind of hybrid category to which the odium and
hence the safeguards of the criminal process do not attach.... However limited
in application the departure from mens rea may be in [public welfare] offenses, it
cannot be doubted that its recognition as an operational concept has been a
powerful brake on the development of a general theory of mens rea in the
criminal law.
... Legislatures are open to severe criticism for their undiscriminating resort
to the criminal sanction. But they have rarely given a clear direction to the
judiciary to impose the stigma of a criminal conviction on persons who are
unaware of the factual circumstances that make their conduct potentially
criminal or upon persons who are, without fault on their part, unaware of the
existence of a legislative norm affecting their conduct.
Id.
205. R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 202, at 904 (footnotes omitted).
206. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 199,
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of justification and excuse is that justification focuses on the act-
"justified conduct is correct behavior, which is encouraged or at least
tolerated" 20 7-while excuse focuses on the actor--excused conduct is
wrong and undesirable, but "criminal liability is inappropriate
because some characteristic of the actor vitiates society's desire to
punish him."20 Homeless persons who have been arrested for sleep-
ing outside, or for some other manifestation of their homeless status,
should be relieved of liability on three grounds: (1) homeless persons'
actions can be justified on the basis of necessity; (2) homeless persons'
can be excused because they lack the requisite state of mind to be
found criminally liable; and (3) prosecution of homeless persons vio-
lates fundamental principles of morality in the criminal law.
A. Justification/Necessity Defense
Justification defenses all have certain "triggering conditions"
that "permit a necessary and proportional response. '209 A case of
necessity arises when, as a result of natural forces, one "must either
suffer detriment or commit an act that violates the letter of the
law."' 210 "[I]f the harm which results from compliance with the law is
greater than that which will result from [its] violation, then [the
actor] is by virtue of the defense of necessity justified in violating
it."' 2 11 The rationale of the necessity defense is that it would be con-
trary to the purpose of the criminal law to punish persons who choose
the greatest value or least harm possible.21 2 There are four require-
ments for the necessity defense: (1) an avoided harm, which may be
harm to the defendant himself; (2) a harm done, which is not limited
229 (1982). "Commonly recognized justifications include self-defense, lesser evils, consent,
and law enforcement." Byrd, Wrongdoing and Attribution: Implications Beyond the
Justification-Excuse Distinction, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1289, 1290 (1987) (footnotes omitted).
207. See Robinson, supra note 206, at 234-36 (discussing the difficulty in categorizing self-
defense and the justification of necessity).
208. Id. "[Excuses] express[ ] an understanding for an actor because of his diminished
ability to conform to the legal or moral norms involved. This diminished ability may be the
result of personal incapacity or the extreme nature of the circumstances." Byrd, supra note
206, at 1290. "Typical excuses are duress, necessity, involuntary intoxication, unavoidable
mistake of law, and insanity." Id. at 1290-91 (footnotes omitted It is sometimes difficult to
categorize some of the criminal law defenses as either justification or excuse. Robinson, supra
note 206, at 234-36 (discussing the difficulty in categorizing necessity and self-defense).
209. Robinson, supra note 206, at 216. To be justified, the response conduct "must be
necessary to protect or further the interest at stake," and "must cause only a harm that is
proportional, or reasonable in relation to the harm threatened or the interest to be furthered."
Id. at 217. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 197, § 3.02 (describing the general
requirements of the defense of justification).
210. R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 202, at 1065.
211. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoT, supra note 131, § 5.4, at 441.
212. See Bayles, supra note 164, at 1192-93.
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to any particular type of harm; (3) an intention to avoid a greater
harm, hence that the individual acted to avoid the greater harm; and
(4) the resulting harm from the defendant's actions be less than the
harm that would have resulted if he had chosen another course.213
Homeless men and women, who have no other choice but to exist
outside, meet the requirements of the necessity defense for their viola-
tion of anti-homeless legislation. For example, a homeless woman
who has been arrested for sleeping in the street would meet the
requirements of the necessity defense. First, she is compelled to sleep.
Second, she has caused some harm in that her violation of the letter of
the law infringes on the government's ability to maintain the public
health, safety, and welfare. Third, the homeless woman has avoided
the greater harm that could have occurred if she had chosen to break
into a building to sleep. Because the greater harm was avoided and
the lesser harm chosen, the homeless woman should be able to utilize
the necessity defense.21 4
B. Excuse
Commentators have explained criminal law excuses on utilitarian
and non-utilitarian grounds.215 Utilitarian theories of punishment
center on deterrence.21 6 The punishment of an excused actor is "inef-
213. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 131, § 5.4(d), at 445-50 (outlining
the requirements of the necessity defense). Additionally, the individual cannot have been
responsible for bringing about the situation that caused the choice of the lesser harm. Id.
§ 5.4(d)(6), at 449-50.
214. The triggering condition of homelessness permits a necessary and proportional
response: sleeping and defecating in public. In New York, the justification defense may get its
first test in a case involving a homeless person. A homeless man was arrested for trespass for
.sleeping in an abandoned apartment building in Long Beach, Long Island, on December 27,
when the temperature was only seven degrees. Police charged him with trespassing. The
man's attorneys, professors at the Hofstra University School of Law, base their defense on
justification. King, Man Trespasses to Stay Alive.- Is He Justified?, N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1990,
at BI, col. 1. "There is no question he committed the misdemeanor of trespass.... But the
law allows for a violator to be considered justified where the threat of harm to a person is
greater than the harm involved in the violation." Id. (quoting Professor Alan Levine of the
Hofstra University School of Law). "Under New York law, such a violation is regarded as
'justifiable and not criminal' when it is 'necessary as an emergency measure to avoid an
imminent public private injury." Id. (quoting Professor Levine). In this case, since there are
no homeless shelters in Long Beach, homeless people can either trespass in abandoned
buildings or risk freezing to death. Id. (citing Professor Douglas Colbert of the Hofstra
University School of Law).
215. Dressler, Justification and Excuses: A Brief Review of the Concepts and the Literature,
33 WAYNE L. REV. 1155, 1165-66 (1987).
216. H. PACKER, supra note 179, at 39-45; see also Murphy, Marxism and Retribution, 2
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 217, 219 (1973) ("[A] utilitarian theory of punishment.., must involve
justifying punishment in terms of its social results .... ").
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ficacious," '217 "because she is undeterrable."21 Non-utilitarian theo-
ries include the causation theory, which excuses criminal behavior
over which the actor has no control,2 19 a character theory, which
excuses behavior when the actor does not possess a bad character,220
and a "personhood" principle, which excuses behavior based on lack
of capacity or opportunity. 22' There are four categories of excuses (in
decreasing order of severity): (1) when the actor has not performed a
volitional act; (2) when there is a voluntary act, but the actor does not
accurately perceive the nature or consequence of the act; (3) when the
actor performs a voluntary act with knowledge of its nature, but does
not know or understand that the act or its consequences are criminal;
and (4) when the actor performs a voluntary act, understanding its
consequences and aware that it is wrong, but cannot control his con-
duct and, therefore, cannot be fairly held accountable for it.
222
Different categories of homeless people meet some or all of the
four categories of excuse. By sleeping in public, defecating in a park,
or obstructing a sidewalk, homeless persons are not performing voli-
tional acts; rather, they are acting under compulsion. Many homeless
individuals do not know or understand the consequences of their acts;
they are merely surviving. Others that do understand the conse-
quences of sleeping in a park, defecating in public, or obstructing a
sidewalk, do not realize that these acts are criminal. Finally, home-
less persons cannot fairly be held accountable for their acts because
performance of such acts is essential for their survival.
223
217. Dressier, supra note 215, at 1165.
218. Id; see also H.L.A. HART, Legal Responsibility and Excuses, in PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 28-53 (1968) (discussing excusing
conditions in the criminal law).
219. Under this theory, an excuse is available when a person's conduct is caused by a
condition over which he has no control. Dressier, supra note 215, at 1166. For a complete
discussion and criticism of the causation theory, see Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73
CALIF. L. REV. 1091 (1973).
220. This theory is based on the assertion that
[A] person does not deserve punishment for committing a bad act unless she is a
bad person, i.e., possesses a bad character.... Excuses are recognized when bad
character cannot be inferred from the bad act. We do not infer bad character, for
example, if the wrongdoer was the victim of severe mental illness or coercion. In
such circumstances, we assume that the person's moral nature is substantially
similar to our own.
Dressier, supra note 215, at 1166
221. This theory excuses an individual when he "substantially lacked the capacity or
opportunity to function in uniquely human fashion." Id. This theory generally has been used
to absolve the insane and infants. Id.
222. Robinson, supra note 206, at 229.
223. Those who say that homeless people are without shelter because of their own
deficiencies are ignoring the statistics. The great majority of homeless are not homeless by
choice, but rather because they have no viable alternative. For a discussion of the
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C. Morality
Courts and commentators have justified criminal punishment in
a number of ways, including retribution, deterrence, incapacitation of
the wrongdoer during punishment, and rehabilitation. 224 Punishment
of homeless persons does not accomplish any of these rationales. Ret-
ribution is not proper because homeless offenders are morally blame-
less. Punishment of homeless citizens does not deter them from being
homeless; when they are released from incarceration, they still have to
exist somewhere (although it may encourage them to relocate to
another area). Moreover, homeless individuals are not rehabilitated
by incarceration. Punishment of homeless men and women can be
readily compared to the punishment of chronic alcoholics, as Justice
Fortas described in his Powell v. Texas22 dissent:
It is entirely clear that the jailing of chronic alcoholics is punish-
ment. It is not defended as therapeutic, nor is there any basis for
claiming that it is therapeutic (or indeed a deterrent). The alco-
holic offender is caught in a "revolving door"-leading from arrest
on the street through a brief, unprofitable'sojourn in jail, back to
the street and, eventually, another arrest. The jails, overcrowded
and put to a use for which they are not suitable, have a destructive
effect upon alcoholic inmates.226
Put simply, punishment of homeless people cannot be morally justi-
fied. As Jeffrie Murphy22 7 so aptly describes:
If we think that institutions of punishment are necessary and desir-
able, and if we are morally sensitive enough to want to be sure that
we have the moral right to punish before we inflict it, then we had
better first make sure that we have restructured society in such a
way that criminals correspond to the only model that will render
punishment permissible- i.e. make sure that they are autonomous
and that they do benefit in the requisite sense.228
Some local governments persist in attempting to justify the arrest
of homeless persons on public welfare grounds. 229 Despite strong
public welfare concerns, the use of arrest to advance these interests is
characteristics of the homeless population, the magnitude of the problem, and its origins, see
supra notes 12-38 and accompanying text. The "why can't they just get a job" argument
ignores these realities. For a discussion of this argument, see supra notes 150-57 and
accompanying text.
224. H. PACKER, supra note 179, at 35-61.
225. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
226. Id. at 564-65 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
227. Murphy, supra note 216.
228. Id. at 243.
229. For an argument in favor of utilizing the police against homeless citizens, see Wilson &
Kelling, Broken Windows, 249 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 29 (1982).
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ill-advised because such a policy does nothing to alleviate homeless-
ness on either a short- or long-term basis.
Local governments also enumerate crime prevention,230 and pro-
tection of homeless persons from abuse and attack, 23 ' as justification
for homeless persons' arrest. Use of the criminal justice system
against homeless persons as a crime prevention tool is misguided.
First, homeless individuals are not likely to commit more serious
crimes than the general population.232 Rather, homeless persons are
most often arrested for minor, victimless offenses, such as loitering,
disorderly conduct, or public intoxication.233 More serious offenses
committed by homeless persons, such as assault, larceny, and bur-
glary, have generally resulted from their subsistence needs.234 A 1985
study of homeless criminal offenders found that most were "supple-
menting criminals" or "criminals out of necessity."' 23" "Supplement-
ing criminals" resort to low levels of illegal acts to supplement the
meager income provided by public assistance or temporary employ-
ment. These illegal acts include supplementing welfare payments
with work income, selling small amounts of drugs, and shoplifting.236
"Criminals out of necessity" are homeless individuals without any
income source who engage in illegal behavior as a means of survival,
including breaking into cars to obtain shelter, failing to pay for restau-
rant meals, living in abandoned buildings without permission, living
in public parks, and shoplifting.237 Second, even if we were to accept
the notion of homeless persons as a serious law enforcement problem,
jailing them for short periods of time for minor offenses, such as sleep-
230. See People v. Davenport, 176 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 10, 16, 222 Cal. Rptr. 736, 739 (App.
Dep't Super. Ct. 1985), cert denied 475 U.S. 1141 (1986). For a discussion of this rationale, see
supra notes 93 & 96-97 and accompanying text.
231. See Davenport, 176 Cal. App. 3d Supp. at 16, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 739. For a discussion
of this rationale, see supra notes 94 & 98.
232. Fischer, Criminal Activity Among the Homeless: A Study of Arrests in Baltimore, 39
Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 46, 49 (1988). Serious crimes are defined using the FBI
standard offense category, Part I, which includes crimes against persons such as homicide,
rape, and aggravated assault, and crimes against property, such as burglary, larceny, and
robbery. Id.
233. Id. (defined using Part II of the FBI standard offense category).
234. Id.
235. A. Solarz, An Examination of Criminal Behavior Among the Homeless (Nov. 13-17,
1985) (paper presented at the American Society of Criminology). The author further
segregated the homeless who commit illegal acts into several categories, including chronic
criminals (the smallest grouping), criminals out of necessity, substance abusers, and the
mentally ill. Id. at 19-21. This study was conducted prior to the increase in the use of crack
cocaine. Today, some homeless people are crack addicts, and therefore may commit crimes to
satisfy their addictions. Arresting them for sleeping on the streets, however, is a misdirected
use of the criminal justice system.




ing in the streets, would not accomplish the traditional goals of crimi-
nal incarceration: punishment, deterrence, or rehabilitation. 38
Use of the criminal justice system to protect homeless individuals
from becoming crime victims is also myopic. Although homeless per-
sons generally experience much higher rates of victimization for rob-
bery, assault, and burglary or theft than other inner-city residents, 39
arresting these individuals for sleeping in the streets and parks does
not significantly change the possibility that they will become crime
victims. They are simply displaced from the streets for a short time;
they are not protected. Because they have no other place to go,
arresting homeless persons cannot be seen as providing them with
shelter for more than a very short period.
Rather than punishing homeless individuals for acts that they
cannot avoid committing in public, the more humane solution to the
problem involves providing adequate shelter and social service
resources and aligning police and social service agencies in a network
to help, rather than harass, homeless citizens. 21 The most efficient
way to involve the criminal justice system within the plight of home-
less persons is to train the system's personnel to deal with the
problems of this special, disadvantaged population, and to integrate
the work of the police and social service agencies. The latter can
manage the problems of homeless citizens far better than jails and
"revolving-door" justice.
V. A CURRENT CHALLENGE: THE POTFINGER CASE
In response to the continual arrests and harassment of homeless
persons in downtown Miami,24 1 homeless advocates filed a class
238. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
239. A. Solarz, supra note 34, at 15-17. Solarz notes that while 1.3% and 3.2% of the
respondents in a national crime survey of inner-city residents reported being robbed and
assaulted, respectively, during the previous six months, 21.4% and 19.2% of homeless persons
reported being similarly victimized. Id. Similar comparisons conducted for property offenses
revealed similar findings. Id. at 17; see also Gibbs, supra note 10, at 46. Gibbs notes that at
least one-third of all homeless women have been raped. Id. A homeless woman in Seattle
exclaimed, "You don't get to sit and relax when you're homeless.... God help your behind
while you're out there." Id.
240. See infra notes 268-76 and accompanying text.
241. For descriptions of particular atrocities, see supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text
The City of Miami has arrested and harassed homeless persons for a number of different
violations, including: disorderly conduct, MIAMI, FLA., CODE § 37.17 (1990); public
intoxication, id. § 37.21; loitering and prowling on public streets, sidewalks, and other public
places, id. §§ 37-34 to 35; standing, sitting, or sleeping on sidewalks, id. § 37-53.1; sleeping in
benches, in parks, or on sidewalks id. § 37-63; sleeping in the park id. § 38-3; sleeping on a
piece of cardboard or a pile of trash, METROPOLITAN DADE COuNTY, FLA., CODE § 38-3
(1990); and sleeping, sitting, or standing in public buildings, FLA. STAT. § 810.08 (1989).
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action lawsuit on behalf of homeless men and women against the City
of Miami ("City")242 for declaratory and injunctive relief243 to bar the
242. Pottinger v. City of Miami, No. 88-2406 (S.D. Fla. filed Dec. 30, 1988). The homeless
plaintiffs are represented by attorneys Benjamin Waxman, Valerie Jonas, and Daniel Jonas,
volunteering for the American Civil Liberties Union.
The Defendant [City of Miami] has a custom, practice and policy of arresting
homeless persons for conduct which is very simply the ordinary activity of daily
life on the streets where Plaintiffs are forced to live. Plaintiffs and the class have
been and continue to be arrested and charged with trespass, obstruction of
streets, sleeping on the sidewalks, sleeping in the parks, littering, loitering, and
vagrancy based solely on conduct such as sleeping, sitting, eating, talking,
tending to personal needs, associating with friends, and raising families. Such
conduct is fundamental to the maintenance of life. Such conduct is legal when
conducted within one's home.
The vast majority of arrests on these charges are never brought to trial.
Rather, Plaintiffs and the class are routed from the streets which are their homes
and taken to jail. Many are released there without further, official process.
Others are incarcerated and then, upon arraignment, by virtue of their
homelessness and related circumstances, are coerced by judges and prosecutors
into pleading guilty in exchange for a sentence to time served. Thus, Plaintiffs
and their class have never had the opportunity to raise any of their valid and
substantial defenses to these charges: e.g. necessity, duress, justification, defense
of self, and defense of others.
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief/Class Action at 5-6, Pottinger (No. 88-2406).
In addition to arresting and harassing the Plaintiffs, the Defendant has a
custom, practice, and policy of seizing and destroying the personal property of
the Plaintiffs, including identification, clothing, medication, food, and bedding
materials before, during, and after its encounters with the Plaintiff. Alterna-
tively, upon arrest of the Plaintiffs by the Defendant, the Plaintiffs are forced, by
virtue of their arrest to abandon all of their personal belongings at the public sites
of their arrests. The foreseeable and inevitable result of either of these scenarios
is that incident to the arrest of homeless persons all of their belongings are lost
forever.
By arresting homeless persons and removing them or temporarily incarcer-
ating them and by seizing and destroying their property, the Defendant has not
legitimately exercised its police powers to protect the health, safety, and welfare
of the people of this city. Rather, the Defendant is harassing, interfering with,
and intimidating homeless persons with no other object than to punish them for
being without shelter or the means to acquire it.
Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, and Compensatory Relief/Class
Action at 6-7, Pottinger (No. 88-2406).
243. On December 29, 1988, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent the
police from conducting "sweeps" of homeless persons which were intended to remove
homeless individuals from the streets of downtown Miami before the Orange Bowl parade (an
annual nationally televised major tourist extravaganza held annually on New Year's Eve in the
streets of downtown Miami). On December 30, 1988, the court denied the preliminary
injunction. The court, however, stated that it:
acknowledges the grievous plight facing [the] plaintiffs and others who are
similarly situated. Life on the streets of Miami ... is a degrading, frightening
experience. The few shelters that provide free lodging and meals apparently
cannot keep pace with the sheer volume of homeless persons. It is also clear that




City from arresting homeless persons for conduct that is necessary for
their daily lives on the public streets. 2" Pottinger v. City of Miami 24
is unique because of the plaintiffs' success in certifying themselves as a
class, 246 and because of their novel challenge to a municipality's
enforcement of various ordinances and statutes that have the effect of
encouraging homeless persons to relocate. The plaintiffs have
asserted a number of legal theories that have been examined in depth
Order on Application for a Preliminary Injunction at 3, Pottinger (No. 88-2406). The Court
relied on the defendant's good faith representation that it would "voluntarily [suspend]
enforcement of any municipal ordinance aimed at arresting persons for merely sleeping on the
sidewalks." Id. at 3. In denying the motion, the court concluded that it "[could not] fashion
an injunction that would provide the requisite specificity," both providing the plaintiffs with
freedom from "harassment" and providing police with notice of what they could and could not
do. Id. at 4.
A police officer working a beat on a busy urban street can hardly be expected to
determine, under penalty of criminal contempt, whether or not the person he
questions or arrests is "homeless." Nor can an officer be expected to determine
whether or not he is proceeding under a law which falls under the undefined
heading "harassment."
Id. at 4-5. The court suggested that the best way to proceed would be "by a fully-briefed, well-
prepared attempt to invalidate obnoxious ordinances, not by enjoining the city police force."
Id. at 6. The court granted a preliminary injunction to prevent the police from destroying
personal property seized from arrested homeless persons in April 1990. Order on Plaintiffs'
Second Application for Preliminary Injunction, Pottinger (No. 88-2406).
Despite the City of Miami's original representations, Miami police continue to arrest
homeless persons for sleeping in parks after closing hours and urinating in public. Rogers,
supra note 8, at AS, col. 1. When Vice-President Dan Quayle visited Miami for a luncheon,
police evicted a group of homeless persons living under a highway underpass for six hours
because his motorcade would pass the site. Id. at AS, col. 5. Police that enforce anti-homeless
ordinances are referred to within the police department as "bum busters." Id. at AS, col. 1. In
addition, in violation of the court's preliminary injunction, Miami police have repeatedly
seized and destroyed property belonging to homeless persons, even emptying out grocery carts
containing individuals' personal possessions and burning these possessions. Id. at AS, cols. 2-
4. On March 18, 1991, the court found the City of Miami in civil contempt for the City's
burning and destruction of homeless person's belongings, which the City had labeled as "clean-
up." The court enjoined the City from any further destruction, ordered it to pay a symbolic
fine to the Camillus House shelter, and ordered the parties to determine the feasibility of leav-
ing two downtown Miami parks open at night for homeless persons. Order Finding City of
Miami in Civil Contempt of Court's April 26, 1990 Order and Providing Further Injunctive
Relief, Pottinger (No. 88-2406).
244. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief/Class Action at 1-7, Pottinger
(No. 88-2406).
245. Pottinger (No. 88-2406).
246. According to the order filed on July 21, 1989, the class was certified to include:
[The named plaintiffs and] approximately 5,000 homeless men and women who
reside on the public streets in the City of Miami in [a narrowly defined
geographic area in downtown Miami] .... Plaintiffs allege that they "have been
arrested in the past and/or expect to be arrested in the future" and seek to
represent those who "have also been, or expect to be, arrested" for conduct
arising from their homeless condition on the public streets.
Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Certification of Class Action at 1, Pottinger (No. 88-
2406).
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in this Comment: namely, a violation of the fourteenth amendment's
due process requirements because of the vagueness and overbreadth
24 7
of the ordinances being enforced; a violation of the eighth amend-
ment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment; 248 and a
defense of necessity.249
Some of the challenged ordinances that should be adjudged
facially vague under the Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville250 and
Kolender v. Lawson 251 rationales include: (1) the disorderly conduct
section, which prohibits "[being] idle, dissolute, or found begging"
and "lounging, prowling or loitering on the streets"; 25 2 (2) the disor-
derly person section, which punishes "any vagrant"; 253 and (3) the
loitering or prowling section, which punishes "any person [who] loi-
ters or prowls in a place, at a time, or in a manner not usual for law
abiding individuals, under circumstances that warrant a justifiable
and reasonable alarm... [including] when a person refuses to identify
himself, or manifestly endeavors to conceal himself."' 2 4 These ordi-
nances fail to provide individuals with adequate notice of prohibited
behavior and fail to provide police with proper guidelines to regulate
enforcement of the ordinances.255
Other ordinances that may not be facially vague should be
adjudged facially overbroad under Kent v. Dulles256 and Papachris-
tou 2 5 7 because they prohibit conduct that is constitutionally protected
and beyond the police power of the state to regulate. Thus, the ordi-
nance that prohibits "sleep[ing] on any of the streets, sidewalks, [or]
public places" 258 should be found facially unconstitutional for over-
breadth because it makes criminal conduct that is usually considered
innocent, giving the police unrestricted judgment in interpreting the
law. Such an ordinance is overbroad as enforced against homeless
persons because it is an unavailing use of the police power.259
247. See supra Section II.
248. See supra Section III.
249. See supra Section IV.
250. 405 U.S. 156 (1971).
251. 461 U.S. 352 (1982).
252. MIAMI, FLA., CODE §§ 37-17(2), (13) (1990).
253. Id. § 37-19.
254. Id. § 37-34.
255. See supra notes 55-69 and accompanying text.
256. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
257. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1971).
258. MIAMI, FLA., CODE § 37-63.
259. See supra notes 70-101 and accompanying text. Miami police do not evenly enforce
the ordinance prohibiting being in parks after closing hours. "Nightly, police ignore the
legions of fishermen who show up after sunset. Some shrimp for hours. all have a home to go
to." Rogers, supra note 8, at 5A, col. 5.
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The anti-sleeping ordinance 260 and the ordinance outlawing
obstruction of free passage on sidewalks 26' should be found unconsti-
tutional as enforced against homeless citizens because, under the
Robinson doctrine,262 the ordinances violate the prohibition against
prosecution for status guaranteed by the eighth and fourteenth
amendments.263 In Miami, there is a severe undersupply of public
and shelter housing, 264 leaving many homeless persons no other
choice but to exist on the streets. Therefore, it should be unconstitu-
tional to prosecute homeless persons for involuntary manifestations of
their homeless status, such as sleeping, bathing, or eating in the streets
and parks.265
If the ordinances are not invalidated on the above constitutional
grounds, the homeless plaintiffs should be able to utilize the defenses
of justification and excuse.266 They are violating the various ordi-
nances because of a lack of other options; thus, criminal punishment
should not be permitted because the homeless plaintiffs lack the requi-
site state of mind to perform the criminal acts and have not performed
any overt acts. Punishment of homeless persons should be barred on
moral grounds because it does not meet any of the goals of criminal
punishment. 267 Rather, it helps to promote an unjustifiable goal of
encouraging homeless men and women to relocate to become another
municipality's burden.
The Pottinger plaintiffs should be afforded relief from arrest and
harassment by police because of the constitutional claims discussed
above. Accordingly, enforcement of the ordinances being challenged
should cease immediately. The court should attempt to fashion a
remedy that encourages the City of Miami to channel resources that
are currently being used to police homeless persons into improving
emergency shelters and assistance. Such a remedy would not only
mollify all of the parties involved, but also would help to remove
homeless people from the streets, and alleviate, to some degree, the
City's public welfare concerns. More importantly, it would be the
most humane way to treat this disadvantaged group.
To assist the police in dealing with homelessness, networks could
260. MIAMI, FLA., CODE § 37-63.
261. Id. § 37-53(1).
262. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
263. Id. at 667.
264. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
265. See supra Section III.
266. See supra notes 206-23 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 224-28 and accompanying text.
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be developed between police and social service agencies.26  Network-
ing between police and social service agencies has three common
goals: to relieve police from having repeatedly to deal with individu-
als whose primary problems are psychiatric, medical, or economic;269
to ensure that law enforcement officers refer only those special popu-
lations that facilities are mandated to assist;270 and to provide needed
assistance to homeless persons to prevent their reentry into the crimi-
nal justice system.2 ' Such networks have the benefit of creating more
time for law enforcement 272 and increasing job satisfaction for police
officials. 273 An arrest-free zone should be established in downtown
Miami, at least encompassing the two downtown Miami parks where
arrests more frequently occur. These parks are rarely used by mem-
bers of the public for recreation, so their use by homeless individuals
will further the public interest. Police, instead of arresting persons
found on the street, would refer them to the appropriate social service
agency for assistance. This solution, of course, assumes the availabil-
ity of adequate resources to fund such programs. Unfortunately,
funding has been widely unavailable in recent times of declining eco-
268. Finn & Sullivan, Emergency Response to the Homeless: The Police Role, 209 NAT'L
INST. JUST. REP. 1 (1988); see also Gibbs, supra note 10, at 49 (describing the importance of
networking between various social service groups in order to provide a wide range of services
for homeless individuals (including drug rehabilitation programs, job training, day care,
parenting classes, health care, and social services)); Johnson & Kayden, A Stand-In for Failed
Representative Government; Homeless: Public-Private Cooperation-And Leadership--To
Help the Poor May Be Our Only Option when There Is Not a Lot of Money, L.A. Times, Nov.
18, 1990, at M5, col. I (describing efforts of a network of cooperating agencies, private and
public, that assist the poor of Los Angeles); Philips, New Program Aids Homeless, N.Y. Times,
May 17, 1987, § 11 (Long Island ed.), at 4, col. 4 (Philips describes the Community Advocates
project that was established as a result of a settlement of a lawsuit filed to insure adequate
housing for homeless people in Long Island. The project established a clearinghouse for
information about organizations offering services for homeless men and women. Many such
organizations were unaware of other organizations' services.).
269. Finn & Sullivan, supra note 268, at 3.
270. Id.
271. Id. Networks have been used primarily to assist the mentally ill. However, some cities
have successfully extended the use of networks to homeless persons and inebriates. Id. at 2
(Boston and New York). All relevant groups must be involved in the planning of the network.
Id. at 3 (discussing the importance of written agreements detailing the roles and
responsibilities of the various agencies and individuals involved). The first step in networking
is to train the police and social workers to interact both with the special populations involved
and with one another. Id. at 3-4 (explaining that training methods include the cross-training
between police and social workers, coursework at the police academy, workshops at various
precincts, and field trips to the social service agencies).
272. Id. (noting that networks substantially reduce the amount of time police spend
responding to the problems of the homeless population, thereby freeing their time for law
enforcement activities).
273. Id. at 3 (citing the benefit of reducing danger to police from dealing with potentially
volatile situations).
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nomic social program budgets.274 One possible source of funds for
social service solutions is the potentially significant savings from oper-
ating efficiencies that would be a result of not utilizing the criminal
justice system against homeless men and women.2 75 As Art Agnos,
the Mayor of San Francisco, stated, "If you give me the money, we
have the chance to end sleeping on the streets .... I'm willing to be
the first mayor in America to say so. '"276
The Pottinger court should attempt to fashion a remedy that
incorporates the networking concept. While such a remedy will not
be easy to shape, it is the only remedy that will provide both short-
and long-term benefits to the Pottinger plaintiffs and to the City of
Miami. Our society must realize the necessity of creative solutions to
the problem of homelessness and be willing to accept such costs as the
cost of living in a "kinder, gentler nation. 2 77 If we choose to con-
tinue with the status quo, the even greater cost due to problems
caused by homelessness is certain to plague generations to come.
VI. CONCLUSION: MORE HUMANE ALTERNATIVES
This Comment argues that certain legislation used to arrest
homeless individuals is unconstitutional both on its face and as
enforced, and that homeless persons can utilize both constitutional
and common law criminal defenses against the enforcement of such
legislation. Applying these arguments to Pottinger provides one
example of a case where homeless persons will be free from prosecu-
tion and the court will be required to devise alternative, humane solu-
tions. The possibility of linking police and social service agencies in a
"network" constitutes a proactive approach that endeavors to provide
a solution to homelessness rather than merely dealing with the effects
of homelessness.
Using the police to arrest and harass homeless individuals is
futile and counter-productive because this approach merely removes
274. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
275. Finn & Sullivan, supra note 268, at 4. (noting that in a study of 12 networks, two were
able to operate without significant special funding); see also Finn, Street People, NAT'L INST.
JUSTICE/RESEARCH IN ACTION (1988).
276. See Gibbs, supra note 10, at 45. When San Francisco received $1.2 million in federal
relief money after the 1989 earthquake, instead of building standard emergency homeless
shelters, the city built a state-of-the-art multi-service center where homeless persons can live,
get health care, see a social worker, treat their addictions, and receive job training. Id.
Camillus House, a homeless shelter in Miami, has a health clinic that renders medical
treatment and provides social welfare to thousands of homeless (and low-income) persons
annually. See Greer, supra note 2, at 413-15.
277. Hoffman, Bush Strategy Minimizes Reagan-Era Liabilities, Wash. Post, Oct. 16, 1988,
at A26, col. 1, A26, col. 2.
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homeless individuals from the streets or parks for a short time. It
does nothing to alleviate the problem in a meaningful way. We must
recognize the huge and growing desperate population living on the
streets of our cities and towns. Solutions to the problem of homeless-
ness are necessarily long-term, involving greater expenditures for edu-
cation, public housing, mental health facilities, and drug-abuse
treatment centers. Short-term solutions, in the form of meeting the
subsistence needs of homeless persons in a more humane fashion by
providing adequate food, shelter, and medical treatment, are also
required. 78 Where local governments do not voluntarily stop the
enforcement of legislation against homeless men and women, courts
must react by declaring such legislation unconstitutional or recogniz-
ing defenses to the legislation's enforcement.
Sadly, many Americans are oblivious to the level of seriousness
that the homeless problem has reached. For many, homelessness is a
problem only confined to the inner-cities, and includes a group of peo-
ple who are easily ignored. They are people to be laughed at, rather
than pitied; people who should "get a job" and "clean up their act."
These views are not the views of a "kinder, gentler nation," nor
should they be the views of the richest, most powerful nation on
earth, a nation that prides itself as an example to all others.
When foreign visitors come to American cities, their reaction
is almost invariably astonishment, and sorrow, at what they see on
the streets. America is a wealthy nation of conspicuous ideals, one
that presumes to have something to teach infant democracies all
around the world. By failing to act creatively, generously and mer-
cifully on behalf of its most desperate citizens, a country loses more
than its credibility; it weakens its character.279
It is disturbing to note the public's perceptions of homeless peo-
ple. When individuals become homeless due to a completely fortui-
tous natural disaster, like an earthquake or a hurricane, the public
responds with an outpouring of sympathy and funds.2 80 The public
278. See Gibbs, supra note 10, at 49. Gibbs discusses the need for multipurpose centers
combining drug rehabilitation programs, job training, day care, parenting classes, health care,
and social services. Id. Traditional shelters do not assist their "clients" by returning to the
streets. Traditional shelters offer a kind of "invisible quarantine: shunned by their neighbors,
the families [have] no sense of community, no help for the problems that put them on the
streets in the first place." Id. at 48.
279. Id. at 49.
280. See Red Cross Raised $98.7 Million for Hurricane, Quake Victims, UPI, Dec. 4, 1989
(LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file). The article noted that:
The American Red Cross has raised $98.7 million-more than twice its previous
record fund-raising-to aid victims of Hurricane Hugo, the California
earthquake, and other recent disasters.... Since Sept. 16 when Hugo [struck][,]
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sympathizes with these individuals, possibly because members of the
public could foresee themselves in the same situation. Yet, when indi-
viduals are homeless by virtue of economic or other difficulties, the
public is not nearly as forgiving, concerned, or involved. Imagine the
outcry if police were to arrest homeless earthquake victims. Yet, this
is the course we sometimes take with other homeless individuals. The
time has come to recognize that the vast majority of homeless persons
are not homeless by choice, but are homeless due to a variety of fac-
tors that could afflict any one of us at any time. So many Americans
are just a missed paycheck or two away from becoming homeless.
The time has come to remedy, rather than ignore, the problem of
homelessness.
DONALD E. BAKER
* . . the Red Cross has sheltered 188,735 people, served 12.4 billion meals and
provided financial assistance to 143,698 families and individuals around the
country.
Id.; Red Cross Announces Final Tally of Disaster Relief Campaign, Business Wire, Feb. 12,
1990 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file) ("The American Red Cross announced... that contri-
butions to its 1989 disaster relief fund ... [was the] highest in its peacetime history." A Red
Cross officer said, "We are very proud of the American public for its outpouring of assistance
to disaster victims.").
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